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EFFICIENT AND ROBUST VIDEO STEGANOGRAPHY 
ALGORITHMS FOR SECURE DATA COMMUNICATION 
ABSTRACT 
Over the last two decades, the science of secretly embedding and 
communicating data has gained tremendous significance due to the technological 
advancement in communication and digital content. Steganography is the art of 
concealing secret data in a particular interactive media transporter such as text, audio, 
image, and video data in order to build a covert communication between authorized 
parties. Nowadays, video steganography techniques are important in many video-
sharing and social networking applications such as Livestreaming, YouTube, 
Twitter, and Facebook because of noteworthy developments in advanced video over the 
Internet.  
The performance of any steganography method, ultimately, relies on the 
imperceptibility, hiding capacity, and robustness against attacks. Although many video 
steganography methods exist, several of them lack the preprocessing stages. In addition, 
less security, low embedding capacity, less imperceptibility, and less robustness against 
attacks are other issues that affect these algorithms. 
This dissertation investigates and analyzes cutting edge video steganography 
techniques in both compressed and raw domains. Moreover, it provides solutions for the 
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aforementioned problems by proposing new and effective methods for digital video 
steganography.  
The key objectives of this research are to develop: 1) a highly secure video 
steganography algorithm based on error correcting codes (ECC); 2) an increased 
payload video steganography algorithm in the discrete wavelet domain based on ECC; 
3) a novel video steganography algorithm based on Kanade-Lucas-Tomasi (KLT) 
tracking and ECC; 4) a robust video steganography algorithm in the wavelet domain 
based on KLT tracking and ECC; 5) a new video steganography algorithm based on the 
multiple object tracking (MOT) and ECC; and 6) a robust and secure video 
steganography algorithm in the discrete wavelet and discrete cosine transformations 
based on MOT and ECC. 
The experimental results from our research demonstrate that our proposed 
algorithms achieve higher embedding capacity as well as better imperceptibility of 
stego videos. Furthermore, the preprocessing stages increase the security and robustness 
of the proposed algorithms against attacks when compared to state-of-the-art 
steganographic methods.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the fact that the Internet is utilized as a medium to access desired 
information, it has also opened a new door for attackers to obtain precious information of 
other users with little effort [1]. Steganography has functioned in a complementary 
capacity to offer a protection mechanism that hides communication between an 
authorized transmitter and its recipient. Steganography is defined as the art of concealing 
secret information in specific carrier data, establishing covert communication channels 
between official parties [2]. Subsequently, a stego object (steganogram) should appear 
the same as an original data that has a slight change of the statistical features. Carrier data 
is also referred as cover or host data [3, 4]. Carriers can be acknowledged in various 
forms such as text, audio, image, and video. A hidden message can also appear in any 
form of data such as text, audio, image, and video [5]. The primary objective of 
steganography is to eliminate any suspicion to the transmission of hidden messages and 
provide security and anonymity for legitimate parties. The simplest way to observe the 
steganogram’s visual quality is to determine its accuracy, which is achieved through the 
human visual system (HVS). The HVS cannot identify slight distortions in steganogram, 
thus avoiding suspiciousness [6]. However, if the size of the hidden message in 
proportion with the size of the carrier object is large, then the steganogram’s degradation 
will be visible to the human eye resulting in a failed steganographic method [7]. 
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Embedding efficiency, hiding capacity, and robustness are the three major 
requirements incorporated in any successful steganographic methods [8]. First, 
embedding efficiency can be determined by answering the following questions [9, 10]: 1) 
how safe is the steganographic method to conceal the hidden information inside the 
carrier object? 2) how precise are the steganograms’ qualities after the hiding procedure 
occurs? and 3) is the secret message undetectable from the steganogram? In other words, 
the steganography method is highly efficient if it includes encryption, imperceptibility, 
and undetectability characteristics. The high efficient algorithm conceals the covert 
information into the carrier data by utilizing some of the encoding and encryption 
techniques prior to the embedding stage for improving the security of the underlying 
algorithm [11]. Figure 1.1 represents the general model of steganographic method. 
 
Figure 1.1 General diagram of the steganography method. 
Steganograms with low alteration rate and high quality do not draw the hacker’s 
attention, and thus will avoid any suspicion for the covert information. If the 
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steganography method is more effective, then the steganalytical detectors will find it 
more challenging to detect the hidden message [12].  
The hiding capacity is the second fundamental requirement which permits any 
steganography method to increase the size of hidden message taking into account the 
visual quality of the steganograms. The hiding capacity is the quantity of the covert 
messages needed to be inserted inside the carrier object. In ordinary steganographic 
methods, both hiding capacity and embedding efficiency are contradictory [13, 14]. 
Conversely, if the hiding capacity is increased, then the quality of steganograms will be 
diminished, decreasing the efficiency of underlying method. The embedding efficiency is 
affected by embedding capacity. To increase the hiding capacity with the minimum 
alteration rate of the carrier object, many steganographic methods have been presented 
using different strategies. These methods utilize linear block codes and matrix encoding 
principles which include Bose, Chaudhuri, and Hocquenghem (BCH) codes, Hamming 
codes, Cyclic codes, Reed-Solomon codes, and Reed-Muller codes [15, 16]. 
Robustness is the third requirement which measures the steganographic method's 
strength against attacks and signal processing operations [17]. These operations contain 
geometrical transformation, compression, cropping, and filtering. A steganographic 
method is robust whenever the recipient obtains the secret message accurately, without 
bit errors. An efficient steganography methods withstand against both adaptive noises and 
signal processing operations [18, 19].  
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1.1 Steganography versus Cryptography and Watermarking 
The common objective of both steganography and cryptography is to provide 
confidentiality and protection of data. The steganography “protected writing” establishes 
a covert communication channel between legitimate parties; while the cryptography 
“secret writing” creates an overt communication channel [20]. In cryptography, the 
presence of the secret data is recognizable; however, its content becomes unintelligible to 
illegitimate parties. In order to increase additional levels of security, steganography and 
cryptography can operate together in one system [21].  
Digital watermarking techniques use a preservation mechanism to protect the 
copyright ownership information from unauthorized users. This process is accomplished 
by concealing the watermark information into overt carrier data [22]. Like 
steganography, watermarking can be used in many different applications such as content 
authentication, digital fingerprints, broadcast monitoring, copyright protection, and 
intellectual property protection [22-26]. Different watermarking techniques can be found 
in the literature [27-35]. Table 1.1 shows the general similarities and differences between 
steganography, cryptography, and watermarking techniques. 
1.2 Motivations and Research Problem  
Video steganography is getting the attention of researchers in the area of video 
processing due to substantial growth in video data. The recent literature reports a 
significant amount of video steganography algorithms. Unfortunately, many of these 
algorithms lack the preprocessing stages. Particularly, there is no video steganography 
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algorithm that includes preprocessing stages for both secret messages and cover videos. 
Moreover, existing steganography techniques suffer major weakness in several aspects 
including security, embedding capacity, imperceptibility, and robustness against attacks. 
Table 1.1 Comparison of steganography, cryptography, and watermarking techniques. 
Description Steganography  Cryptography Watermarking 
Goal achieved: Communication channels are 
covert 
Data content of 
communication channels 
are covert 
Copyright protection 
exists 
Goal failed: Communication is detected Plain-text is retrieved  Watermark is erased or 
exchanged 
Common carrier 
file: 
Text, audio, image, or video Plain-text or image  Image or video 
Secret information:  Any type of data plain-text watermark 
Secret keys: May exist Must exist May exist 
Extraction phase: Carrier data is unnecessary  Carrier data is unnecessary 
during deciphering process 
Carrier data availability 
depends on the 
application 
Output file: Steganogram Cryptogram Watermarked object 
Security level: Depends on the embedding 
algorithms 
Depends on the secret keys Depends on the 
watermarking algorithms 
Information 
transparency: 
Invisible Visible Transparency depends on 
the application 
Robustness level: Against detection Against deciphering Robust watermarking, 
fragile watermarking, 
and semi-fragile 
watermarking 
Common attacks: Steganalysis Cryptanalysis Signal processing 
operations 
Requirements: Embedding efficiency, 
embedding payload, 
undetectability, and 
robustness 
Robustness Robust watermarking 
requires robustness while 
fragile and semi-fragile 
watermarking do not 
need robustness 
This research is motivated by the limitations of the existing video steganography 
algorithms, and is based on the following reasons to improve the performance of these 
algorithms: 
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1) By utilizing the preprocessing stages to include the procedure of manipulating 
both secret messages and cover videos prior to the embedding stage in order to 
enhance the security and robustness of the steganographic method. 
2) Using a portion of each frame throughout all video as regions of interest for the 
embedding process, the imperceptibility of stego videos will improve. 
Accordingly, we track the facial regions and moving objects in video. Since it is 
very challenging for attackers to determine the location of secret message in video 
frames because the secret message is only embedded into facial regions and 
moving objects which changes from frame to frame, it is necessary to preserve the 
security and robustness of embedded data.  
3) Applying encryption methods and ECC such as Hamming codes and BCH codes 
to encode the secret message prior to the embedding process will produce a secure 
and robust steganographic algorithm. 
4) Transforming video frames into frequency domain such as DWT and DCT 
transformations will improve the robustness of the steganographic method against 
attacks, hence preserving imperceptibility of stego videos.      
 
1.3 Main Contributions of the Proposed Research 
Our research investigates some innovative approaches to improve video 
steganography methods. The main objective of this thesis is to develop and validate a 
new method to outperform the existing video steganography techniques from the 
literature. In this dissertation, the key contributions are as follows: 
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 A highly secure video steganography algorithm based on ECC is proposed. In 
order to enhance the security and robustness of this algorithm against attacks, the 
secret message is embedded into specific areas of each video frame, randomly. 
The algorithm achieves better imperceptibility of stego videos as well as higher 
embedding capacity of secret data [36, 37]. 
 An increased payload video steganography algorithm in the discrete wavelet 
domain based on ECC is proposed. This method not only improved the capacity 
of the encoded secret message, but also increased the robustness against attacks, 
providing a reasonable tradeoff with the imperceptibility [19, 38-40].  
 A novel video steganography algorithm based on KLT tracking and ECC is 
proposed, which controls the limitations of some state-of-the-art steganographic 
algorithms in terms of security and imperceptibility. This algorithm utilizes facial 
regions as carrier data to conceal the secret message, which operates in the spatial 
domain [41]. 
 A robust video steganography algorithm in the wavelet domain based on KLT 
tracking and ECC is proposed. This method uses wavelet coefficients of facial 
regions as cover data to embed the secret information, hence enhancing the 
security and robustness of the hidden data [9]. 
 A new video steganography algorithm based on the MOT and ECC is proposed. 
This algorithm utilizes multiple motion objects in the video frames as regions of 
interest to hide the secret information, which operates in the spatial domain. This 
method improves each of imperceptibility and embedding capacity when 
compared to the related video steganography methods [42]. 
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 A robust and secure video steganography algorithm in DWT-DCT domains based 
on MOT and ECC is proposed. The proposed algorithm has utilized MOT and 
ECC as the preprocessing stages which in turn provides a better confidentiality to 
the secret message prior to embedding phase. In order to enhance the security and 
robustness of the proposed method, both wavelet and cosine frequency 
coefficients of moving objects through the video frames are utilized as host data 
to embed the secret message [43]. 
 A comprehensive survey and analysis of state-of-the-art video steganography 
techniques in both compressed and raw domains is provided. This survey will 
guide the reader to comprehend the existing methods of video steganography and 
its main issues [44, 45]. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 Introduction 
Due to the advancement of the Internet and multimedia technologies, digital 
videos have become a popular choice for data hiding. The digital video contains a 
massive amount of data redundancy which can be utilized for embedding secret 
messages. Recently, there are many useful applications of video steganography 
techniques such as video error correcting [42, 46-48], military services [49], bandwidth 
saving [50, 51], video surveillance [41, 52, 53], and medical video security [54, 55].  
In the past, many video steganography techniques have been proposed in the 
literature. Unfortunately, this literature lacks video steganography survey articles. So, we 
conducted an extensive study that included all video steganography techniques from past 
decades. This thesis provides a comprehensive survey and analysis of state-of-the-art 
video steganography methods. Figure 2.1 clarifies the hierarchy of the overall system 
protection which includes video steganography. Video steganography methods are 
classified into compressed and raw domains. 
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Figure 2.1 Disciplines of overall system protection. 
2.2 Video Steganography Techniques in Compressed Domain 
The H.264 standard has increased the efficiency of video compression when 
compared to the previous versions. Some new features of H.264 video codec include 
flexible macroblock ordering, quarter-pixel interpolation, intra prediction in intra frame, 
deblocking filtering post-processing, and multiple frames reference capability [56-59]. 
Usually, H.264 codec comprises a number of group of pictures (GOP). Every GOP 
includes three types of frames: intra (I) frame, predicted (P) frame, and bidirectional (B) 
frame. During the video compression process, the motion estimation and compensation 
processes minimize the temporal redundancy. Since the video stream is a number of 
correlated still images, a frame can be predicted by using one or more referenced frames 
based on the motion estimation and compensation techniques. First, frames are divided 
into 16x16 macroblocks (MB) wherein each MB contains blocks that may include the 
smallest size of 4x4. When applying a few searching algorithms, block 𝐶 in the present 
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frame is compared, individually, to one of the selected block ?̃? in the referenced 
frame ?̃? in order to find a corresponding block 𝐶. The prediction error between two 
blocks (𝐶 and ?̃?) of size b can be measured using sum of absolute differences (SAD).  
                                                𝑒 = 𝑆𝐴𝐷(𝐶, ?̃?) =  ∑ |𝑐𝑖,𝑗 − ?̃?𝑖,𝑗| 
1≤𝑖,𝑗≤𝑏
                                  (2.1) 
Where 𝑐𝑖,𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̃?𝑖,𝑗 refer to block values. The best matched block will have a 
minimum SAD using 𝐶’s prediction denoted by ?̃?. The motion vector (MV) and 
differential error 𝐷 = 𝐶 − ?̃? are required for the coding process. In compressed domain, 
video steganography techniques are categorized according to the video coding stages. 
These stages are used as venues for data hiding such as intra frame prediction, inter frame 
prediction, motion vectors, transformed and quantized coefficients, and entropy coding. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the H.264 video codec standard that indicates some venues for data 
hiding.  
2.2.1 Video steganography techniques in intra frame prediction  
During the video compression process, the macroblocks are encoded using a 
number of intra prediction modes. In H.264 codec, the numbers of intra prediction modes 
are nine for 4x4 blocks and four for 16x16 blocks which are illustrated in Figure 2.3 and 
Figure 2.4, respectively. Also, the high efficiency video coding (HEVC) codec can 
support up to 35 intra prediction modes for each 64x64, 32x32, 16x16, 8x8, and 4x4 
block sizes as shown in Figure 2.5. For data concealing purposes, these modes can be 
mapped to one or more of secret message bits.  
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Figure 2.2 H.264 hybrid video codec standard shows venues for data hiding. 
Liu et al. [60] presented a new secure data hiding technique which performs 
entirely in a compressed domain. The framework of this algorithm consists of four stages. 
First, in the video sequences parser stage, the video sequences are coded, and discrete 
cosine transform (DCT) coefficients are obtained. In addition, the motion vectors, and the 
intra coded macroblocks are acquired. In the second stage, scene detection is performed 
on the consecutive intra frames to identify the fluctuation scenes. The fluctuation scene is 
identified using a histogram variation of DC coefficients within intra frame DCT 
coefficients. In the third stage, the embedding process is achieved using only intra frames 
of fluctuation scenes. The last stage is called video steganalysis. Here, the security level 
of the stego video is statistically measured to determine whether it is high or low. If the 
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stego video is detected by the steganalysis, then it will adjust the scale factor to make it 
stronger. The algorithm introduced by Liu et al. has limited capacity for hidden data 
because the fluctuation scenes of intra frames are only used for data embedding.  
Chang et al. [61] presented a data concealing algorithm using HEVC utilizing 
both DCT and discrete sine transform (DST) methods. In this scheme, HEVC intra 
frames are used to conceal the hidden message without propagating the error of the 
distortion drift to the adjacent blocks. Blocks of quantized DCT and DST coefficients are 
selected for embedding the secret data by using a specific intra prediction mode. The 
combination modes of adjacent blocks will produce three directional patterns of error 
propagation for data hiding, consisting of vertical, horizontal, and diagonal. Each of the 
error propagation patterns has a range of intra prediction modes that protect a group of 
pixels in any particular direction. The range of the modes begins at 0 and ends at 34. 
Chang et al.’s algorithm has a low embedding payload because the selection of blocks for 
the embedding process must meet predefined conditions. 
Hu et al. [62] and Zhu et al. [63] presented data hiding methods using intra 
prediction modes for H.264/AVC. During the intra frame coding process, the secret 
message is embedded into the 4x4 luminance block. These algorithms utilize the 4x4 
intra prediction modes in order to hide one bit of secret information per block. The 4x4 
intra prediction modes are divided into two subsets based on the predefined mapping 
rules between the secret message and intra prediction modes in order to embed 0 or 1 of 
the secret message bits. Table 2.1 illustrates the mapping rule of 4x4 intra prediction 
modes of the Hu et al.’s method, which shows that each most probable mode and its 
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candidate modes mapped to 0 or 1. Both Hu and Zhu methods achieve a negligible 
degradation of video quality as well as a small increase on the bit rate. In general, the 
steganographic techniques that use the intra frame prediction as venues for data hiding 
have low embedding capacities to conceal secret messages. 
 
Figure 2.3 H.264 intra prediction modes for 4x4 blocks. 
 
Figure 2.4 H.264 intra prediction modes for 16x16 blocks. 
 
15 
 
 
Figure 2.5 The 35 HEVC intra prediction modes [64]. 
Table 2.1 Mapping rules for 4x4 intra prediction modes [62]. 
Most Probable 
Mode 
Candidate Modes  
Mapping to 0 
Candidate Modes  
Mapping to 1 
Mode 0 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6, 7, 8 
Mode 1 0, 3, 4, 8 2, 5, 6, 7 
Mode 2 0, 3, 4, 8 1, 5, 6, 7 
Mode 3 0, 5, 6, 8 1, 2, 4, 7 
Mode 4 0, 3, 6, 8 1, 2, 5, 7 
Mode 5 0, 3, 6, 8 1, 2, 4, 7 
Mode 6 0, 3, 4, 8 1, 2, 5, 7 
Mode 7 0, 5, 6, 8 1, 2, 3, 4 
Mode 8 0, 1, 3, 4 2, 5, 6, 7 
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2.2.2 Video steganography techniques in inter frame prediction  
In many video steganography methods, the seven block sizes that include 16x16, 
16x8, 8x16, 8x8, 8x4, 4x8 and 4x4 of H.264 inter frame prediction are commonly utilized 
as a venue to embed the secret message by mapping each block type to a number of 
secret bits. Kapotas et al. [65] proposed a data concealing algorithm for scene change 
detection in H.264 coding. This method uses four different block sizes. Each one is 
mapped onto one pair of a secret message. In this algorithm, the secret message consists 
of scene change frames information that will be embedded into the encoded videos. This 
embedded information will help the scene change detection algorithm, in H.264 video 
stream, functioning in real time.  However, the data hiding methods of the intra frame 
prediction have a very limited embedding capacity. An example of steganographic 
method that uses mapping rules, let “NY” is the secret information that must be 
embedded into the inter frame prediction blocks in H.264 codec. The embedding goal can 
be achieved by using mapping rules of different block sizes. Figure 2.6 illustrates the 
embedding process using mapping rules.   
 
Figure 2.6 Using mapping rules for prediction block type to conceal “NY” characters. 
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2.2.3 Video steganography techniques in motion vectors 
Motion vector characteristics such as horizontal, vertical, amplitude, and phase 
angles components are utilized in embedding secret information. Xu et al. [66] proposed 
a compressed video stream steganography. In this scheme, the embedding process relies 
on I, P, and B frames. First, the hidden data is concealed into the motion vectors of P and 
B frames. Only the motion vectors that have a high magnitude are chosen. Here, each 
macroblock has a motion vector; however, the selected macroblocks are moving rapidly. 
Secondly, the control information is embedded into I frames. This control information 
includes the capacity payload and segment range of each GOP. Each GOP contains one I 
frame which carries the control information necessary for the data extraction phase. In 
addition, each GOP has a number of P and B frames which contain secret messages in 
their high magnitude motion vectors. Xu et al.’s method has a low embedding payload 
because it only used the motion vectors with a high magnitude.  
Pan et al. [67] presented a new steganography method in the H.264 video standard 
based on the motion vectors and linear block codes. The embedding process is achieved 
by using motion vectors of inter frames macroblocks, and, then discarding the 
surrounding macroblocks. By using a predefined threshold, a group of motion vectors are 
selected in each video inter frame. The values (0 or 1) of selected motion vectors (𝑀𝑉𝑟) 
are obtained by calculating the phase angles (φ) illustrated in Figure 2.7. By definition, 
phase angles are the arctangents of both vertical (MVv) and horizontal (MVh) motion 
vectors’ components as given in Eq. 2.2. 
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                     𝜑 = 𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛 (
𝑀𝑉𝑣
𝑀𝑉ℎ
)      (0° ≤ 𝜑𝑖 < 360
°)                                           (2.2) 
 
Figure 2.7 Motion vector representation in [67]. 
Once the 𝑀𝑉𝑟  values are obtained, the hidden information is concealed into the 
motion vector array utilizing the linear block code principle. The reason for using the 
linear block codes is to minimize the motion vectors’ alteration rate and increase 
embedding capacity. The results of this algorithm have demonstrated that in every 6 bits 
of motion vector array, 4 bits of the secret data can be hidden. The peak signal to noise 
ratio (PSNR) of the obtained stego videos is 37.45 dB, which is proven by reducing 
alteration rate of motion vectors. However, this method has a limited hiding capacity due 
to it is based on the number of motion vectors. The data embedding and extracting phases 
of the Pan et al.’s method is illustrated in Eq. 2.3-2.6 as follows: 
  𝑆𝑌 =  𝑀𝑉𝑟𝐻
𝑇             (2.3) 
  𝑏 = 𝑆𝑌⨁ 𝑆                    (2.4) 
  𝑀𝑉𝑟
𝑤 = 𝑀𝑉𝑟⨁ 𝐸𝑏        (2.5) 
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  𝑆′ = 𝑀𝑉𝑟𝐻
𝑇⨁ 𝐸𝑏𝐻
𝑇         (2.6) 
Where S and S′ are embedded and extracted messages. 𝑀𝑉𝑟 and 𝑀𝑉𝑟
𝑤 are original 
and stego selected motion vectors. 𝑆𝑌, 𝐸𝑏, and 𝐻
𝑇are syndrome, coset leader of 𝑏, and 
transpose of parity check matrix, respectively [67].  
Bin et al. [68] presented a new data concealing algorithm using the motion vector 
and matrix encoding processes. The naked eye can realize the difference that happens 
when the object moves tardily, while if the object transfers rapidly, then the change will 
be unnoticeable. The motion vectors that have large amplitudes are produced from the 
macroblocks that move quickly. The sizable motion vectors will be utilized for 
concealing the hidden message. The selected motion vectors for data embedding include 
two properties: 1) the motion vector’s amplitude must be greater than the predefined 
threshold T; and 2) both the vertical and the horizontal motion vector components must 
not be equal. Moreover, the best component (MVw) of both the vertical (𝑀𝑉𝑣) and the 
horizontal (MVh) motion vectors are chosen based on their phase angles (θ). Then, the 
process of hiding the secret message is performed using matrix encoding, reducing the 
modification rate of selected motion vectors. The least significant bit (LSB) of the 
selected motion vectors (𝑀𝑉𝑤_𝐿𝑆𝐵) is utilized for embedding secret bits. The average 
PSNR of the stego videos is 38.18 dB [68]. However, this algorithm has a low embedding 
capacity because the selected motion vectors have restricted conditions. The embedding 
stage of the algorithm introduced by Bin et al. can be carried out as follows: 
𝑀𝑉𝑤 = {  
𝑀𝑉ℎ        0 ≤  𝜃 <  𝜋/4
𝑀𝑉𝑣    𝜋/4 ≤  𝜃 <  𝜋/2 
                                  (2.7) 
20 
 
                             𝜃 = arctan|𝑀𝑉𝑣/𝑀𝑉ℎ|                                              (2.8) 
   𝑀𝑉𝑤_𝐿𝑆𝐵 = {  
𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑   ; 𝑖𝑓   𝑀𝑉𝑤 = 0                                 
1                       ; 𝑖𝑓  𝑀𝑉𝑤_𝐿𝑆𝐵 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑉𝑤 ≠ 0
0                       ; 𝑖𝑓  𝑀𝑉𝑤_𝐿𝑆𝐵 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑉𝑤 ≠ 0
     (2.9) 
In a different work, Jue et al. [69] designed a new algorithm for H.264/AVC 
video steganography using motion vectors as cover data.  In this scheme, the luminance 
macroblocks for inter frames (P and B) video coding is used. Using a predefined 
threshold, the motion vectors with a large magnitude will be selected, while the motion 
vectors of slow objects will be discarded. Then, the hidden data bits will be concealed 
into the difference of both horizontal and vertical components for the selected motion 
vectors. This algorithm has improved the utilization ratio and the embedding efficiency. 
The modified motion vector’s feature (P̂i) including the secret message can be calculated 
as follows: 
?̂?𝑖 =
{
  
 
  
 
 
 
𝑚𝑜𝑑 [|𝑉𝑑𝑥| − |𝑉𝑑𝑦|, 2]                    ; 𝑖𝑓    𝑃𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖                 
𝑚𝑜𝑑 [|𝑉𝑑𝑥 + 0.25| − |𝑉𝑑𝑦|, 2]     ; 𝑖𝑓   𝑃𝑖 ≠ 𝑆𝑖   𝑎𝑛𝑑       
                                                                      |𝑉𝑑𝑥| − |𝑉𝑑𝑦| ≥ 0
𝑚𝑜𝑑 [|𝑉𝑑𝑥| − |𝑉𝑑𝑦 + 0.25|, 2]     ; 𝑖𝑓   𝑃𝑖 ≠ 𝑆𝑖   𝑎𝑛𝑑       
                                                                      |𝑉𝑑𝑥| − |𝑉𝑑𝑦| < 0
           (2.10) 
𝑃𝑖 and  𝑆𝑖 are motion vector features and secret message bits. 𝑉𝑑𝑥 and 𝑉𝑑𝑦 are 
horizontal and vertical motion vector components, respectively. However, Jue et al.’s 
scheme is limited to the embedding payload due to the high value of the predefined 
threshold.  
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The steganographic techniques that commonly utilize motion vectors as carrier 
objects to hide the secret messages have low embedding capacities. Moreover, a high 
modification rate on the motion vectors will negatively influence the quality of the stego 
videos. 
2.2.4 Video steganography techniques in transform coefficients 
(DCT, QDCT, and DWT)  
The DCT, quantized discrete cosine transform (QDCT), and discrete wavelet 
transform (DWT) coefficients of the luminance component are also good candidates to 
conceal the secret message due to their low, middle, and high frequency coefficients for 
data embedding. Shahid et al. [70] proposed a reconstruction loop for information 
embedding of intra and inter frames for H.264/AVC video codec. This method embeds 
the secret message into the LSB of QDCT coefficients. Only non-zero QDCT coefficients 
are chosen for data hiding process, utilizing the predefined threshold which directly 
depends on the size of secret information. Edges, texture, and motion regions of intra and 
inter frames are utilized in the concealing process. Shahid et al.’s algorithm extracts the 
hidden message easily and maintains the efficiency of compression domain.  
On the other hand, Thiesse et al. [71-73] presented a steganography of motion 
data in the chrominance and luminance of video frame components. In order to control 
the modification of bitrate in the H.264 codec, the motion vector indices are embedded 
into the selected DCT coefficients of both luminance and chrominance components. In 
addition, the hidden indices minimize the distortion drift propagation of the prediction 
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process to the next frames utilizing the rate-distortion optimization. The summation of 
the selected QDCT coefficients (𝑆𝑖
𝑤) is modified as follows:   
      𝑆𝑖
𝑤 = {
𝑆𝑖                     ; 𝑖𝑓 |𝑆𝑖| 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 𝐼𝑖
𝑆𝑖 +𝑚𝑖           ; 𝑖𝑓 |𝑆𝑖| 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 ≠ 𝐼𝑖
                        (2.11) 
                                    𝑆𝑖 = ∑𝑎𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
                                                                           (2.12) 
Where 𝑎𝑛 represents quantized coefficients, and 𝑆𝑖 represents the summation of 
quantized coefficients of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ block. 𝐼𝑖 is the prediction index and 𝑚𝑖 represents shifted 
coefficients. In this method, the distortion drift propagation is low. However, the 
embedding capacity of the secret message is limited.  
Meuel et al. [74] proposed information concealing in H.264 codec for lossless 
reconstruction of the region of interest (ROI). This method protects the facial features of 
video stream by embedding facial regions into the DCT coefficients. Two LSBs of non-
zero QDCT coefficients are utilized to embed the facial information. Only the skip mode 
is used during inter coded prediction of the ROI. Both DC and AC DCT coefficients of 
ROI macroblocks are set to 1 and 0, respectively, in order to guarantee predicting the 
original ROI macroblocks during the decoding process. The facial pixels are determined 
as skin pixels if the Euclidean distance is lower than the predefined threshold value 𝑑 
using the following formula:  
√(𝑃𝑢 − 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢)2 + (𝑃𝑣 − 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑣)2   < 𝑑               (2.13) 
Where 𝑃𝑢 and 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢 are the Cb and its reference components, respectively, 𝑃𝑣 and 
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑣  are the Cr and its reference components, respectively. The suggested method of 
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Meuel et al. achieved a high quality of the region of interest based on the lossless 
reconstruction.  
In a different work, Li et al. [75] proposed a new algorithm for H.264 video 
steganography. During the video coding process, the quantized coefficients in each 4x4 
luminance of inter frame macroblocks are used for embedding the secret message. The 
majority zero values of quantized coefficients are located on the bottom-right corner 
because it is a high frequency region. Conversely, the majority of non-zero values of 
quantized coefficients belonging to low frequency band are located on the top-left corner. 
An array of inverse zigzag scan mode equaled to every 16 quantized coefficients will be 
produced in order to obtain the last non-zeros more efficiently. Using a predefined 
threshold T (0-15), based on the scan point, the last non-zero coefficient is selected in 
every macroblock. Depending on the parity of odd and even, the secret message of 1-bit 
per block is concealed. If the hidden bit is 1, then the selected DCT coefficients (V) 
modifies as follows:  
?̂? = {
 𝑉                  𝑖𝑓 𝑉 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 1
𝑉 − 1          𝑖𝑓 𝑉 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉 > 0
𝑉 + 1          𝑖𝑓 𝑉 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉 < 0
  (2.14) 
Otherwise, the selected DCT coefficients (𝑉) are modified as follows:  
?̂? = { 
𝑉                  𝑖𝑓 𝑉 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 0
𝑉 + 1          𝑖𝑓 𝑉 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉 > 0
𝑉 − 1          𝑖𝑓 𝑉 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉 < 0
  (2.15) 
Li’s method has limited data embedding payload because the selected blocks 
embed only one bit per 4x4 block. Correspondingly, both Ma et al. [76] and Liu et al. 
[77] presented a video data hiding for H.264 coding without having an error 
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accumulation in intra video frames. In the intra frame coding, the current block predicts 
its data from the encoded adjacent blocks, specifically from the boundary pixels of upper 
and left blocks. Thus, any embedding process that occurs in these blocks will propagate 
the distortion, negatively, to the current block. In addition, the distortion drift will be 
increased toward the lower right intra frame blocks. To prevent this distortion drift, 
authors have developed three conditions to determine the directions of intra frame 
prediction modes. The 4x4 blocks have nine prediction modes (0-8) and 16x16 blocks 
have four prediction modes (vertical, horizontal, DC, and plane). In the 4x4 block, the 
first condition is the right mode {0,3,7}; the second condition is both the under-left mode 
{0,1,2,4,5,6,8} and the under mode {1,8}; and the third condition is the under right-
mode {0,1,2,3,7,8}. To select 4x4 QDCT coefficients of the luminance component for 
data embedding, the three conditions must be presented together. However, the two 
methods have a low embedding payload because only the luminance of the intra frame 
blocks that meet the three conditions are selected for hiding data.  
Later, Liu et al. [78, 79] presented a robust data hiding using H.264/AVC codec 
without a deformation accumulation in the intra frame based on BCH codes. By using the 
directions of the intra frame prediction, the deformation accumulation of the intra frame 
can be prevented. Some blocks will be chosen as carrier object for concealing the covert 
message. This procedure will rely on the prediction of the intra frame modes of adjacent 
blocks to prevent the deformation that proliferates from the neighboring blocks. The 
authors used BCH encoding to the hidden message before the embedding phase to 
enhance the method performance. Then, the encoded information is concealed into the 4x4 
25 
 
QDCT coefficients using only a luminance plane of the intra frame. Liu et al. defined N as 
a positive integer and Ỹij as selected DCT coefficients (i, j=0,1,2,3). The embedding 
process of this method is carried out by the following steps: 
1. If |Ỹij| = N + 1 or |Ỹij| ≠ N, then the Ỹij will be modified as follows: 
?̃?𝑖𝑗 = {
?̃?𝑖𝑗 + 1            if ?̃?𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 and |?̃?𝑖𝑗| = 𝑁 + 1  
?̃?𝑖𝑗 − 1            if ?̃?𝑖𝑗 < 0 and |?̃?𝑖𝑗| = 𝑁 + 1 
?̃?𝑖𝑗                    if |?̃?𝑖𝑗| ≠ 𝑁 + 1 𝑜𝑟 |?̃?𝑖𝑗| ≠ 𝑁
  (2.16) 
2. If the secret bit is 1 and |?̃?𝑖𝑗| = 𝑁, then the ?̃?𝑖𝑗  will be changed as follows: 
?̃?𝑖𝑗 = {
?̃?𝑖𝑗 + 1        if ?̃?𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 and ?̃?𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁 
?̃?𝑖𝑗 − 1        if ?̃?𝑖𝑗 < 0 and ?̃?𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁
               (2.17) 
3. If the secret bit is 0 and |Ỹij| = N, then the Ỹij will not be modified. 
Overall, the previously mentioned methods that use DCT, QDCT, and DWT 
coefficients as venues to hide secret messages are restricted to a limited number of 
coefficients in the embedding phase. Moreover, these algorithms do not include the secret 
message and cover data preprocessing stages, which are necessary to improve security 
and robustness of any of the steganographic methods.  
2.2.5 Video steganography techniques in entropy coding CAVLC 
and CABAC 
During the H.264 compression, context adaptive variable length coding (CAVLC) 
and context adaptive binary arithmetic coding (CABAC) entropy coding can be used as 
host data to carry secret messages within many video steganography techniques. Ke et al. 
[80] presented a video steganography method relies on replacing the bits in H.264 stream. 
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In this algorithm, CAVLC entropy coding has been applied in the data concealing 
process. During the video coding and after the quantization stage, authors used non-zero 
coefficients of high frequency regions for the luminance component of the embedding 
process. Here, non-zero coefficients in high frequency bands are almost “+1” or “-1”. The 
embedding phase can be completed based on the trailing ones sign flag and the level of 
the codeword parity flag. The sign flag of the trailing ones changes if the embedding bit 
equals “0” and the parity of the codeword is even. Also, the sign flag changes if the 
embedding bit equals “1” and the parity of the codeword is odd. Otherwise, the sign flag 
of the trailing ones does not change. The trailing ones are modified as follows:  
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑠 = {
 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑      ; 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 0  
 𝑜𝑑𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑       ; 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 1  
    (2.18) 
The modification of high frequency coefficients does not have an impact on the 
video quality.  However, the embedding capacity is low because Ke’s method is 
established on the non-zero coefficients of the high frequencies that consist of a large 
majority of zeros.  
Similarly, Liao et al. [81] proposed real-time data concealing in H.264/AVC 
codec. During the process of CAVLC in 4x4 blocks, the trailing ones are utilized for 
embedding the secret data. The performance of this method was achieved through low 
computational complexity, negligible degradation of the video quality, and an 
unchangeable bit-steam size. This method employed random sequences as secret data. It 
is embedded into the selected blocks of CAVLC trailing ones as follows: 
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?̂?𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑠 =
{
  
 
  
 
 2                          ; 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑠 ≥ 3  
1                          ; 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑠 = 2,
                             𝑜𝑟
                                   𝑤 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑠 = 0
 
0                           ; 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑠 = 1 
𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑      ; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                           
                (2.19) 
Where 𝑤 represents secret data that is hidden into the trailing ones codeword 
within range of 0 to 3. ?̂?𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑠 represents modified trailing ones.  
Additionally, Lu et al. [82] proposed real-time frame dependent video 
watermarking in CAVLC coding. In order to achieve the real-time detection, the CAVLC 
encoder is applied during this algorithm. During the process of video coding, the secret 
data is embedded into the run-level pairs of each frame’s macroblocks. Table 2.2 
illustrates run-level pairs (r, l) and codewords of the CAVLC encoder. This algorithm 
keeps the bit-rate almost unchangeable. However, it has limited embedding capacity for 
secret messages. The block diagram of the data hiding process that was introduced by Lu 
et al. is illustrated in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8 Block diagram of the embedding process in method [82]. 
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Table 2.2 VLC table (s denotes the sign bit). 
(run, level)  Variable length code Bit length 
(0,1) 11s 3 
(0,2) 0100s 5 
(0,3) 0010 1s 6 
(0,4) 0000 110s 8 
(0,5) 0010 0110s 9 
Wang et al. [83] presented a real-time watermarking method in the H.264/AVC 
codec based on the CABAC features. The CABAC encoder uses a unary binarization, 
which is a process of concatenating all binary values of syntax elements. A certain 
number of motion vectors for both P and B frames are utilized for the data hiding process 
using the CABAC properties. The secret watermark is embedded by displacing the binary 
sequence of the selected syntax elements orderly. This method achieves a low 
degradation of the video quality because of the difference between the original code and 
the replacement code is very small (at most 1 bit is altered out 8-bits of the selected 
motion vector). This small difference is also the reason of achieving a little bit-rate 
increase. The percentage of the increased bit-rate 𝜇 is calculated as follows: 
                       𝜇 =
𝑚 − 𝑢
𝑢
× 100%                                                      (2.20) 
where u and m indicate the bit-rate of the original and the watermarked videos 
respectively. The flowchart of Wang’s method is illustrated in Figure 2.9. Also, the 
diagram of the CABAC encoder is shown in Figure 2.10.  
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Generally, the previous methods that utilize CAVLC and CABAC entropy coding 
as venues to conceal secret messages are limited in capacity due to the restricted number 
of selected blocks in the embedding stage. Moreover, when using the entropy coding, the 
quality of the steganogram is severely distorted. 
Table 2.3 clarifies the advantages and limitations of each venue for concealing 
secret messages in the compressed domain. These venues include: intra frame prediction, 
inter frame prediction, motion vectors, DCT coefficients, QDCT coefficients, DWT 
coefficients, CAVLC entropy coding, and CABAC entropy coding. 
 
Figure 2.9 The data embedding framework in [83].  
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Figure 2.10 General block diagram of the CABAC encoder. 
Table 2.3 Advantages and disadvantages of each venue for data concealing in compressed domain. 
Venues for data hiding  Characteristics (According to 
compressed video steganography 
techniques) 
Limitations 
Intra frame prediction The computational complexity is 
moderate 
The embedding capacity is 
low and the impact on the 
video quality is high 
Inter frame prediction  The influence on the video quality 
and the computational complexity 
are low 
The embedding capacity 
needs to be improved 
Motion vectors Both embedding payload and 
computational complexity are 
moderate 
The impact on the video 
quality is high 
DCT/QDCT/DWT coefficients Achieve a high embedding payload 
as well as a low computational 
complexity 
The influence on the video 
quality is high 
CAVLC/CABAC entropy coding Achieve a high embedding payload 
as well as a low computational 
complexity 
The quality of the 
steganogram is severely 
distorted 
2.3 Video steganography Techniques in Raw Domain 
Unlike the compressed video, raw video steganography techniques deal with the 
video as a sequence of frames with the same format. First, digital video is converted into 
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frames as still images, and then each frame is individually used as carrier data to conceal 
the hidden information. After the embedding process, all frames are merged together to 
produce the stego video. Raw video steganography techniques operate in both spatial and 
transform domains [84]. 
2.3.1 Video steganography techniques in spatial domain 
There are many steganography techniques that rely on the spatial domain such as 
LSB substitution, bit-plane complexity segmentation (BPCS), spread spectrum, ROI, 
histogram manipulation, matrix encoding, and mapping rule. Basically, these techniques 
utilize the pixel intensities to conceal the secret message. Zhang et al. [85] presented an 
efficient embedder utilizing BCH encoding for data hiding. This embedder hides the 
covert information into a block of carrier object. The concealing phase is achieved by 
modifying different coefficients in the input block to set the syndrome values null. This 
method enhances embedding payload and execution duration compared to others. Zhang 
et al.’s method modifies the complexity of the algorithm from exponential to linear.  
Cheddad et al. [86] presented a skin tone data concealing method which depends 
on the YCbCr color space. YCbCr is utilized in different methods such as object detection 
and compression techniques. In YCbCr, the correlation between RGB colors is isolated by 
separating the luminance (Y) from the chrominance blue (Cb) and the chrominance red 
(Cr). In this method, the human skin areas are recognized, and Cr of these areas are used 
for embedding the hidden information. Overall, the method has a limited embedding 
capacity because the secret message is embedded only in the Cr plane of the skin region.  
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Similarly, Sadek et al. [87] proposed a robust video steganography method based 
on the skin region of interest. The secret message is concealed into the wavelet 
coefficients of skin regions for each blue and red components. This method is robust 
against MPEG compression. However, the results of comparison demonstrated that 
Cheddad et al.’s method outperformed Sadek et al.’s algorithm in both imperceptibility 
and embedding capacity.  
Alavianmehr et al. [88] presented a robust uncompressed video steganography by 
utilizing the histogram distribution constrained (HDC). In this method, the Y component 
of every frame is segmented into non-overlapping blocks (𝐶) of size 𝑚 × 𝑛. Then, the 
secret message is concealed into these blocks based on the shifting process. The selected 
blocks are changed only when the secret message bits are “1”. The modified frame 𝑆 of 
the 𝑘𝑡ℎ block is calculated as follows: 
?̂?𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗) = {  
𝑆𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗) + 𝛾         ; 𝑖𝑓 𝛼 ∈ [0, 𝑇] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑖, 2) = 𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑗, 2)    
𝑆𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗) − 𝛾         ; 𝑖𝑓 𝛼 ∈ [−𝑇, 0] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑖, 2)  ≠ 𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑗, 2)
 𝑆𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗)                ; 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                              
        (2.21) 
𝛾 =
     (𝐺 + 𝑇) × 2    
𝑚 × 𝑛
                                                                     (2.22) 
                                 𝛼𝑘 =∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗) × 𝑁(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑖=1
                                             (2.23) 
𝑁(𝑖, 𝑗) = {  
    1           ; 𝑖𝑓  𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑖, 2) = 𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑗, 2)    
−1          ; 𝑖𝑓  𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑖, 2)  ≠ 𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑗, 2)   
                      (2.24) 
Where 𝛾, 𝛼, and 𝑁 are the shift quantity, the arithmetic difference, and the 
computed matrix for each block, respectively. Also, 𝑇 and 𝐺 are two predefined thresholds 
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used in this method. Alavianmehr et al.’s method withstands against compression attack. 
However, it utilizes only Y plane for data embedding process.  
Eltahir et al. [89] proposed a high rate data concealing algorithm. In each frame, a 
3-3-2 approach is used based upon the LSB of three color channels (RGB). A 3-3-2 
method refers to 3-bits of Red, 3-bits of Green, and 2-bits of Blue in each pixel that are 
used to hide the secret data as shown in the Figure 2.11.  
Later, Dasgupta et al. [90] optimized the [89] method based on the genetic 
algorithm in order to enhance both the security of the covert information and the visual 
quality of the steganogram. The reason for this improvement is to develop an objective 
function that is based on the weights of different parameters such as MSE and HVS. 
However, [89] and [90] algorithms are not robust against signal processing, noises, and 
video compression due to the fact that they operate in the spatial domain. 
 
Figure 2.11 The hiding capacity in each RGB pixel [89]. 
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Kawaguchi et al. [91] proposed principles and applications of BPCS 
steganography. In this method, the video frame is first converted into 8 bit-planes, and 
then each bit-plane is divided into informative (simple) and noise-like (complex) regions. 
The BPCS technique differs from the LSB technique in the number of bit-planes that are 
utilized for embedding secret message. The BPCS technique uses all bit-planes (0 – 7) for 
data hiding while the LSB technique only uses a bit-plane 0 for the embedding process.  
Figure 2.12 clarifies how one of the video frames converts to 8 bit-planes by 
applying the BPCS technique. The secret information is embedded into the complex 
regions to achieve a high embedding payload. Moreover, modifying the noise-like areas in 
each bit-plane for data hiding purposes has a minimal influence to the human visual 
system. The complexity (𝛼) level is measured in each region whether informative or 
complex, and 𝛼 can be defined as follows:  
                                            𝛼 =
  𝑘  
  2𝑚(𝑚 − 1)  
 , (0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1)                                          (2.25) 
Where 𝑘 equals the total length of the black-and-white border in the selected 
region, and 2𝑚(𝑚 − 1) is the highest possibility of the border length gained from the 
selected region. 𝑚 ×  𝑚 represents the size of the selected region. Figure 2.13 illustrates 
the complexity degree of the BPCS regions according to Kawaguchi’s method. 
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Figure 2.12 The process of converting one of the Foreman video frames into 8 bit-planes using the BPCS 
technique. 
 
Figure 2.13 BPCS complexity degree of different regions: left informative region and right noise-like 
region. 
Sun [92] proposed a new information hiding method based on the improved BPCS 
steganography. The regular BPCS method computes the complexity of the selected region 
based on the total length of the black-and-white border. This technique introduces a new 
method that identifies the noise-like regions which is useful, especially, in periodical 
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patterns. Each canonical gray coding (CGC), run-length irregularity, and border noisiness 
are utilized to measure the complexity level of the selected regions. Based on the 
complexity degree, the secret data is embedded into the noise-like areas. In order to 
expand the capacity of the secret information, the informative regions are converted into 
the complex regions using the conjugation operation. If 𝑛 is the length of pixels and ℎ[𝑖] is 
the repetition of run-lengths in each black-or-white of 𝑖 pixels, then run-length irregularity 
of the binary pixels (𝐻𝑠) in Sun’s algorithm can be calculated as follows:  
                                     𝐻𝑠 = −∑ℎ[𝑖] 𝑙𝑜𝑔2
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑖                                                     (2.26) 
                                        𝑃𝑖 =
  ℎ[𝑖]  
 ∑ ℎ[𝑗]𝑛𝑗=1   
                                                                  (2.27) 
In conclusion, the steganographic methods that operate in the spatial domain are 
simple and obtained a high payload of secret messages. However, these techniques are not 
robust against signal processing, noises, and compression. Moreover, most of the above-
mentioned methods do not take advantage of applying the preprocessing stages on both 
cover videos and secret messages. Once applied, the robustness and security of the 
steganographic algorithms will be enhanced. 
 2.3.2 Video steganography techniques in transform domain 
In video steganography methods that operate in transform domain, each video 
frame is individually transformed into frequency domain using DCT, DWT, and discrete 
Fourier transform (DFT) and the secret message is embedded utilizing the low, middle, or 
high frequencies of the transformed coefficients.  
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Patel et al. [93] presented a new data hiding method using the lazy wavelet 
transform (LWT) technique, where each video frame is divided into four sub-bands, 
separating the odd and even coefficients. The secret information is then embedded into the 
RGB LWT coefficients. For accurate extraction of embedded data, the length of the 
hidden data is embedded into the audio coefficients. The amount of the secret message in 
Patel’s method is high. However, this type of wavelet is not a real mathematical wavelet 
operation which is not robust enough against attacks.  
On the other hand, Spaulding et al. [94] presented the BPCS steganography 
method using an embedded zerotree wavelet (EZW) lossy compression. In this method, 
the DWT’s coefficients are representing the original frame’s pixels. Therefore, the BPCS 
steganography can be applied to DWT coefficient sub-bands which contain different 
features. The features of DWT sub-bands include correspondence, complexity, and 
resiliency against attacks. Each DWT sub-band is divided into pit-planes, and then the 
quantized coefficients are used for hiding the covert data. This method achieves a high 
embedding capacity around a quarter of the size of the compressed frame. Figure 2.14 
illustrates the data embedding process of Spaulding’s method. 
Noda et al. [95] presented a video steganography technique utilizing the BPCS and 
wavelet compressed video. The 3D set partitioning in hierarchical trees (SPIHT) and 
motion-JPEG2000 are the two coding techniques that use the DWT domain. First, each 
bit-plane of the video frame and the secret message is segmented into 8x8 blocks. Then, 
the noise-like, bit-plane blocks are selected using the threshold of the noise-like 
complexity measurement. The two wavelet compression techniques are applied on the 
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selected blocks by using the BPCS method, hiding the secret data into the quantized DWT 
coefficients. The experimental results of Noda et al.’s algorithm demonstrated that the 3D 
SPIHT coding method has a higher embedding payload than the Motion-JPEG2000 
coding method when using BPCS steganography. However, the suggested algorithm of 
Noda et al. is not guaranteed that all type of cover videos contain enough noise-like bit-
plane regions. Moreover, this method is only applied to the wavelet-based compression 
domain. 
 
Figure 2.14 A block diagram representing the data concealing phase of the method [94]. 
Ordinarily, the steganographic techniques based on the transform domains improve 
the robustness against signal processing, noises, and compression. However, these 
techniques are more complex than the spatial domain methods.  
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2.4 Hamming Codes 
In this section, the Hamming codes technique will be explained and discussed 
through a specific Hamming (15, 11) example. Hamming codes are defined as one of the 
most powerful binary linear codes. These types of codes can detect and correct errors that 
occur in the binary block of data during the communication between parties [96]. The 
codeword includes both original and extra data with a minimum amount of data 
redundancy, and is the result of the encoded message that uses the Hamming codes 
technique. In general, if p is parity bits of a positive integer number 𝑝 ≥ 2 ; then, the 
length of the codeword is  𝑛 = 2𝑝 − 1. The size of the message that needs to be encoded 
is defined as  𝑘 = 2𝑝 − 𝑝 − 1. The number of parity bits that must be added to the 
message is 𝑝 = 𝑛 − 𝑘  with the rate of  𝑟 = 𝑘/𝑛 [51, 97]. 
In this dissertation, Hamming codes (15, 11) and (7, 4) are utilized to encode the 
secret message prior to the embedding process. For instance, the Hamming code (15, 11), 
which n=15, k=11, and p=4, can correct the identification of a single bit error. A message 
of size 𝑀 (𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ,  𝑚11) is encoded by adding 𝑝 (𝑝1,  𝑝2,  𝑝3,  𝑝4) extra bits as parity 
to become a codeword of 15-bit length. The codeword is prepared to transmit through a 
communication channel to the receiver end. The common combination of both message 
and parity data using these type of codes is to place the parity bits at the position of 2𝑖  
(i=0, 1, …, n-k) as follows:  
p1, p2, m1, p3, m2, m3, m4, p4, m5, m6, m7, m8, m9, m10, m11                   (2.28) 
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During the encoding and decoding processes, the generator matrix G and parity-
check matrix H are being used by the Hamming code (15, 11). At the transmitter channel, 
a message M, which includes of 11-bit, will be multiplied by the generator matrix G, and 
then, manipulated by having modulo of 2. The codeword X of 15-bit is obtained and 
ready to be sent. 
                       𝑋(1×𝑛) = 𝑀(1×𝑘) × 𝐺(𝑘×𝑛)                                                    (2.29) 
At the receiver channel, the encoded data (message + parity) which is a codeword 
R of 15-bit will be received and checked for errors. Once the received codeword R is 
multiplied by the parity-check matrix H, modulo of 2 will then be applied. A syndrome 
vector Z (𝑧1,  𝑧2,  𝑧3,  𝑧4) of 4-bit is obtained. If the received message is correct, then Z 
must have all zero bits (0000); otherwise, during the transmission, one or more bits of the 
received message might be flipped.  In that case, the error correction process must occur.    
                       𝑍(1×𝑝) = 𝑅(1×𝑛) × 𝐻
𝑇                                                                        (2.30) 
Where   𝐻 = [
1  0   0   0  1   0  0   1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1
0  1   0   0  1   1   0  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0
0  0   1   0  0   1   1  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  0
0  0   0   1  0   0   1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  1
]                  (2.31)                               
The reason of using parity bits in the Hamming codes is to protect the message 
during communication. In the Hamming code (15, 11), 7 bits of the message are used to 
calculate each of parity bit (total 8-bit), which is illustrated in the Figure 2.15. A group of 
3 bits of the message are used to consider each of parity bit in the Hamming code (7, 4), 
which is shown in the Figure 2.16. 
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Figure 2.15 Venn diagram of the Hamming codes (15, 11). 
Hamming code (15, 11) is explained through the example stated below. A 
message M1 consists of 11-bit (11111111111), X1 is a transmitted codeword, R1 is a 
received codeword, and Z1 a syndrome, then the process of finding the Hamming code 
(15, 11) is conducted as follows: 
1) Calculate: 𝑋1 = 𝑀1 × 𝐺, then X1 vector equals to (777711111111111). By 
applying modulo of 2 to the X1 vector, 15-bit codeword (111111111111111) is 
obtained. Then, this 15-bit codeword is sent to the destination side.  
2) To obtain the correct message on the receiver side, the syndrome Z1 vector must 
have all zero bits after taking Z1’s modulo of 2.  
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3) For example, if R1=111111111111111 is received error-free, then Z1 vector will 
be (0000).  
4) However, assume we have a noisy channel and one of the bits has flipped during 
the transmission. Then, the received codeword R1=111111111011111 contains 
one bit error. Thus, the syndrome Z1 will become (0101).  
5) In an error example, checking Z1 vector with the parity-check matrix H, it showed 
that Z1 (0101) is equal to the row number 10 of the parity-check matrix H, which 
appears that the 10th bit of R1 has flipped.   
6) Upon changing the 10th bit of R1 from 0 to 1, R1 will be correct 
(111111111111111).  
7) Hence, the original message M1 (11111111111) of 11-bit can be obtained by 
taking R1 and ignoring the first 4-bit. 
 
Figure 2.16 Venn diagram of the Hamming codes (7, 4). 
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2.5 BCH Codes 
Bose, Chaudhuri, and Hocquenghem invented the BCH encoder. It is one of the 
most powerful random cyclic code methods, which can be used for detecting and 
correcting errors in a block of data. The BCH code is different from the Hamming code 
because BCH code can correct more than one bit. The BCH codes inventors decided that 
the generator polynomial g(x) will be the polynomial of the lowest degree in the Galois 
field GF (2), with ∝,∝2, ∝3, … , ∝2𝑡 as roots on the condition that ∝ is a primitive of 
GF(2 m). When Mi(x) is a minimal polynomial of ∝
i where (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 2𝑡), then the least 
common multiple (LCM) of 2t minimal polynomials will be the generator polynomial 
g(x). The g(x) function and the parity-check matrix H of the BCH codes [19, 98] are 
described as follows: 
𝐻 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1      ∝              ∝2                 ∝3                …  ∝𝑛−1    
  1     (∝3)         (∝3)2           (∝3)3            … (∝3)𝑛−1
 1     (∝5)         (∝5)2           (∝5)3            … (∝5)𝑛−1
     .           .                  .                  .                                   .     
.           .                  .                  .                                   .
.           .                  .                  .                                   .
      1      (∝2𝑡−1)      (∝2𝑡−1)2    (∝2𝑡−1)3  … (∝2𝑡−1)𝑛−1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
            (2.32) 
𝑔(𝑥) = 𝑙𝑐𝑚{𝑀1(𝑥),𝑀2(𝑥),𝑀3(𝑥), … ,𝑀2𝑡(𝑥)}                                           (2.33) 
𝑔(𝑥) = 𝑀1(𝑥) 𝑀3(𝑥) 𝑀5(𝑥) … 𝑀2𝑡−1(𝑥)                                                   (2.34) 
A binary BCH code (n, k, t) can correct errors of a maximum t bits for a codeword 
𝑊 = {𝑤0, 𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛−1} of length n and a message 𝐴 = {𝑎0, 𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑘−1} of length 
k [37]. An embedded codeword 𝐶 = {𝑐0, 𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛−1} is calculated as follows:  
                                              𝐶 = 𝑊 ∗ 𝐻𝑇                                                         (3.35) 
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At the receiver side, the codeword 𝑅 = {𝑟0, 𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛−1} is obtained. The 
transmitted and received codewords can both be interpreted as polynomials, where 
 𝐶(𝑋) = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑥
1 +⋯+ 𝑐𝑛−1𝑥
𝑛−1, and 𝑅(𝑋) = 𝑟0 + 𝑟1𝑥
1 +⋯+ 𝑟𝑛−1𝑥
𝑛−1. The error 
E is the difference between C and R, which indicates the number and location of flipped 
elements in C. The E and syndrome Y are calculated as follows: 
                                       𝐸 = 𝑅 − 𝐶                                                     (3.36) 
                          𝑌 = (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝐻𝑇 = 𝐸𝐻𝑇                                           (3.37) 
In this dissertation, we use BCH codes (15, 11, 1) and (7, 4, 1) over the GF(2 4) 
and GF(2 3), respectively, to encode the secret message prior to the embedding process. 
The parameters for the BCH code (15, 11, 1) are m=4, k=11, and 𝑛 = 2 4 − 1 = 15, 
while for the BCH code (7, 4, 1) are m=3, k=4, and 𝑛 = 2 3 − 1 = 7. 
2.6 Discrete Cosine Transform 
DCT is a well-known method which is utilized in many applications such as 
image and video compression. The DCT separates the signal into low, middle, and high 
frequency regions. The DCT is closely related to the discrete Fourier transform (DFT). It 
is a separable linear transformation; that is, the 2D-DCT is equivalent to a 1D-DCT 
performed along a single dimension followed by a 1D-DCT in the other dimension [99]. 
For an input video frame, A, of resolution M x N the DCT frequency coefficients for the 
transformed frame, B, and the inverse DCT coefficients of the reconstructed frame are 
calculated according to the following equations, respectively: 
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𝐵𝑝𝑞 =∝𝑝∝𝑞 ∑ ∑𝐴𝑚𝑛
𝑁−1
𝑛=0
𝑀−1
𝑚=0
𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜋(2𝑚 + 1)𝑝
2𝑀
𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜋(2𝑛 + 1)𝑞
2𝑁
                            (2.38) 
𝐴𝑚𝑛 = ∑ ∑ ∝𝑝∝𝑞 𝐵𝑝𝑞
𝑁−1
𝑞=0
𝑀−1
𝑝=0
𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜋(2𝑚 + 1)𝑝
2𝑀
𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜋(2𝑛 + 1)𝑞
2𝑁
                          (2.39) 
           Where             ∝𝑝= {
  
1
√𝑀
, 𝑝 = 0                
√
2
𝑀
, 1 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑀 − 1
 
And                 ∝𝑞= {
  
1
√𝑁
, 𝑞 = 0                
√
2
𝑁
, 1 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑁 − 1
 
A (m, n) is the pixel value in row m and column n of the frame A, and B (p, q) is 
the coefficient in row p and column q of the 2D-DCT matrix. Each of low, middle, and 
high frequency coefficients were used as cover data to embed the encoded secret message 
[100]. 
2.7 Discrete Wavelet Transform 
DWT is a well-known method that transfers the signal from the time domain to 
the frequency domain [101]. The DWT separates high, middle, and low frequencies and 
its boundaries from one another, while other methods, such as DCT, group the various 
frequencies into estimated regions. The first level of the 2D-DWT image decomposition 
is applied to the cover video frame. It splits the frame into four sub-bands, LL 
(approximation), LH (horizontal), HL (vertical), and HH (diagonal), using both a low 
pass filter 𝐿𝑜_𝐷(𝑧) and a high pass filter 𝐻𝑖_𝐷(𝑧) for the decomposition process. LL is a 
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low frequency sub-band, which is an approximation of the original frame reduced to a 
quarter of its size. The LH, HL, and HH sub-bands are middle and high frequencies that 
contain detailed information about any image. In the second level of frame 
decomposition, the 2D-DWT is applied to the LL sub-band, producing four new sub-
bands [102, 103]. In this dissertation, some results are demonstrated based on the first 
level of decomposition. Figure 2.17 illustrates the first level of a two-dimensional DWT 
decomposition showing each of LL, LH, HL, and HH sub-bands. The LH, HL, and HH 
coefficients were used as cover data to embed the encoded secret message. In addition, 
Figure 2.18 shows the third level of the decomposition process. 
 
Figure 2.17 First level of a two-dimensional DWT decomposition [104]. 
47 
 
 
Figure 2.18 Third level of the 2D-DWT decomposition. 
To achieve a complete reconstruction process, the following wavelet equations 
must be satisfied: 
{𝐿𝑜_𝐷(𝑧)𝐻𝑖_𝐷(𝑧) +   𝐿𝑜_𝑅(𝑧)𝐻𝑖_𝑅(𝑧)} = 2                                    (2.40) 
𝐿𝑜_𝑅(𝑧) = 𝑧−𝑘𝐻𝑖_𝐷(−𝑧), 𝐻𝑖_𝑅(𝑧) = 𝑧𝑘𝐿𝑜_𝐷(−𝑧)                             (2.41) 
In the above equations, 𝐿𝑜_𝐷(𝑧) and 𝐻𝑖_𝐷(𝑧) represent the wavelet filter bank of 
the decomposition process. Furthermore, 𝐿𝑜_𝑅(𝑧) and 𝐻𝑖_𝑅(𝑧) signify the wavelet filter 
bank of the reconstruction process. The following equations are the transfer functions of 
the Haar wavelet transform filters: 
𝐿𝑜_𝐷(𝑧) =
1
2
(1 + 𝑧−1)                                                   (2.42) 
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𝐻𝑖_𝐷(𝑧) = (𝑧 + 1)                                                        (2.43) 
𝐻𝑖_𝑅(𝑧) =
1
2
(𝑧 − 1)                                                      (2.44) 
𝐿𝑜_𝑅(𝑧) = (𝑧−1 − 1)                                                    (2.45) 
2.8 Face Detection  
To detect the facial area in the first video frame, one of the most powerful and fast 
algorithm in object detection has been used. It is called the Viola-Jones object detection 
algorithm. The reason of using the Viola-Jones detector in this dissertation is that this 
detector consists of three major contributions. The first contribution is the integral image, 
which introduces a new image representation. The integral image representation can 
compute the selected features (Haar-like features) much faster than other detectors [105]. 
The second contribution of the Viola-Jones detector is building a specific feature based 
classifier using an AdaBoost algorithm. The third contribution of the Viola-Jones 
algorithm is identifying a cascade structure, which consists of combining many complex 
classifiers [106]. The cascade object detector eliminates unimportant areas such as an 
image’s background, and focuses on the important areas of the image that contain a given 
object such as a facial region [107, 108]. Figure 2.19 shows the process of detecting the 
facial region in the video frame using the Viola-Jones face detection algorithm. 
2.9 KLT Face Tracking  
In this section, we will introduce the KLT tracking algorithm which is used for 
feature selection and tracking objects. The process of facial detection in all video frames is 
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costly, because this process requires a high computation time [109, 110]. In addition, 
when a person moves fast or tilts his head the result will cause the detector to fail based on 
the training stage of the classifier. Therefore, it is important to have an alternative 
algorithm which tracks the face throughout the video frames. Once the Viola-Jones 
detector algorithm is applied to the first frame for purposes of detecting the facial region, 
the KLT tracking algorithm will be applied throughout the remaining video frames.  
 
Figure 2.19 Detecting the ROI in the first video frame. a) original frame, b) detected facial region frame 
after applying the Viola-Jones face detection [107]. 
The KLT algorithm operates by finding good feature points (Harris corners) in the 
facial area from the first frame. These feature points are tracked throughout all the video 
frames [111, 112]. Each feature point will have a corresponding point between two 
consecutive frames. The displacement of the corresponding point pairs can be computed 
as motion vectors. The process of tracking the facial region depends on the movement of 
the centers of the features in two successive video frames. The following equations show 
the process of face tracking across the video frames [113, 114]: 
                             Rt = Rt−1 + (Ct − Ct−1)                                                       (2.46) 
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                                      Ct =
1
|ft|
∑ ft(i)
i
                                                                    (2.47) 
                                  Ct−1 =
1
|ft−1|
∑ft−1(i)
i
                                                          (2.48) 
Where Rt and Rt−1 represent the face areas in two adjacent video frames, 
respectively. Ct and Ct−1 are the position centers of features in two consecutive frames, 
respectively. Also,  ft and ft−1 are the feature points in current and previous frames, 
respectively [115].  Figure 2.20 displays the process of tracking the facial regions 
throughout the video frames using KLT algorithm. 
 
Figure 2.20 Face tracking in video frames. a) and b) two original different frames in tested video, c) and d) 
show facial regions that are tracked in the two frames using KLT tracking algorithm [111, 112]. 
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2.10 Motion-based Multiple Object Tracking  
Due to its various applications, computer vision is one of the fastest emerging 
fields in computer science. The detection and tracking of moving objects within the 
computer vision field has recently gained significant attention [116]. The tracking of 
moving objects is commonly divided into two major phases: 1) detection of moving 
objects in an individual video frame, and 2) association of these detected objects 
throughout all video frames in order to construct complete tracks [42, 117]. 
In the first phase, the background subtraction technique is utilized to detect the 
regions of interest such as moving objects. This technique is based on the Gaussian 
mixture model (GMM), which is the probability of density function that equals to a 
weighted sum of component Gaussian densities. The background subtraction method 
computes the differences between consecutive frames that generate the foreground mask.  
Then, the noises will be eliminated from the foreground mask by using morphological 
operations. As a result, the corresponding moving objects are detected from groups of 
connected pixels. 
The second phase is called data association. It is based on the motion of the 
detected object. A Kalman filter is employed to speculate the motion of each trajectory. 
In each video frame, the location of each trajectory is predicted by the Kalman filter. 
Moreover, the Kalman filter is utilized to determine the probability of a specific detection 
that belongs to each trajectory [117]. Figure 2.21 shows four video frames that contain 
multiple objects and their foreground masks. 
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Figure 2.21 Left column: four video frames from S2L1 PETS2009 dataset [118], middle column: detecting 
multiple motion objects in the corresponding frames, and right column: foreground masks for the 
corresponding frames. 
2.11 Performance Assessment Metrics 
The main purpose of steganography techniques is to conceal the secret information 
inside the cover video data, thus the quality of the cover data will be changed ranging 
from a slight modification to a severe distortion. In order to evaluate whether the 
distortion level is acceptable or not, statistically, different metrics have been utilized [119]. 
PSNR is a common metric utilized to calculate the difference between the carrier and 
stego data. The PSNR can be  calculated as follows [120]: 
                        𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
∑ ∑ ∑ [𝐶(𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘)ℎ𝑘=1
𝑛
𝑗=1 − 𝑆(𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘)]
2𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑚 × 𝑛 × ℎ
                       (2.49) 
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                                     𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅 = 10 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔10 (
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶
2
𝑀𝑆𝐸
)      (𝑑𝐵)                                (2.50) 
C and S represent the carrier and stego frames. Both m and n indicate the frame 
resolutions, and h represents the RGB colors (k=1, 2, and 3). 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶 is the highest pixel 
value of the frame C. PSNR-HVS (PSNRH) and PSNR-HVS-M (PSNRM) objective 
measurements are utilized to enhance the quality of the steganograms. The PSNRM is an 
upgraded form of the PSNRH. Each of PSNRH and PSNRM relies on the DCT 
coefficients of the transform domain [121]. PSNRH and PSNRM can be calculated using 
Eq. 2.51 and Eq. 2.52 [122]: 
                         𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅𝐻 = 10 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔10 (
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶
2
𝑀𝑆𝐸ℎ𝑣𝑠
)   (𝑑𝐵)                                     (2.51) 
                         𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑀 = 10 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔10 (
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶
2
𝑀𝑆𝐸ℎ𝑣𝑠𝑚
)   (𝑑𝐵)                                 (2.52) 
MSEhvs and MSEhvs_m utilize the factor matrix and the 8x8 DCT coefficients of 
the carrier and stego frame blocks [121]. On the other hand, the performance of 
steganographic method in terms of embedding capacity is a major factor that any method 
tried to increase it with the respect of the visual quality. According to [123], any 
steganographic method has a high embedding capacity if the hidden ratio exceeds 0.5%. 
The embedding ratio is calculated in the following formula:    
          𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
× 100%                  (2.53) 
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To further evaluate the performance of any steganographic algorithm in terms of 
robustness, two objective metrics including bit error rate (BER) and similarity (Sim) are 
used. These metrics are applied to determine whether the secret messages are retrieved 
from the stego videos successfully by comparing the embedded and extracted secret data. 
The BER and Sim  are computed in the following formulas [124]: 
                           𝐵𝐸𝑅 =
∑ ∑ [𝑀(𝑖, 𝑗)⨁𝑏𝑗=1
𝑎
𝑖=1 ?̂?(𝑖, 𝑗)]
𝑎 × 𝑏
× 100%                                 (2.54) 
                   𝑆𝑖𝑚 =
∑ ∑ [𝑀(𝑖, 𝑗) ×𝑏𝑗=1
𝑎
𝑖=1 ?̂?(𝑖, 𝑗)]
√∑ ∑ 𝑀(𝑖, 𝑗)2𝑏𝑗=1
𝑎
𝑖=1  × √∑ ∑ ?̂?(𝑖, 𝑗)
2𝑏
𝑗=1
𝑎
𝑖=1
                    (2.55) 
Where 𝑀 and ?̂? are the embedded and extracted secret data, and a and b are the 
size of the secret data. 
2.12 Summary 
In this chapter, many past and present video steganography methods are 
introduced. The advantages and drawbacks of each approach in different video 
compression stages are highlighted. These stages include: intra frame prediction, inter 
frame prediction, motion vectors, transformed coefficients, and entropy coding. In 
addition, advantages and limitations of raw video steganography techniques that operate in 
both spatial and transform domains are given. Furthermore, Hamming codes, BCH codes, 
discrete cosine transform, discrete wavelet transform, face detection, KLT face tracking, 
motion-based multiple object tracking, and performance assessment metrics are deeply 
reviewed. Table 2.4 provides a summary of related works of all video steganography 
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techniques that operate in both compressed and raw domains. This summary highlights 
each of venues for data hiding, robustness against attacks, video preprocessing, secret 
message preprocessing, performance measures of embedding capacity and video quality.  
Table 2.4 Venues, embedding capacity, video quality, robustness, video and message preprocessing of the 
discussed video steganography methods 
Technique Domain/venue 
for data hiding 
Embedding capacity Video quality Robustness Video 
preprocessing 
Message 
preprocessing 
Liu et al. [60] Compressed 
domain/ Intra 
frame 
prediction  
Low embedding 
capacity (only luma 
DCT coefficients of 
scene change Intra 
frames are used) 
PSNR ranges 36 
– 42 dB 
Robust against 
video 
compression 
 
Not used Encryption 
Chang et al. 
[61] 
Compressed 
domain/ Intra 
frame 
prediction 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 1.04% 
37 dB when the 
bitrate is 20000 
Kb/s 
Robust against 
HEVC 
compression 
Not used Not used 
Hu et al. [62] 
Zhu et al. 
[43]  
 
Compressed 
domain/ Intra 
frame 
prediction 
modes 
At most 1 bit per 
qualified 
 Intra 4 × 4  luma block 
 
Almost the same 
as compressed 
video 
Robust against 
H.264/AVC 
compression 
Not used Not used 
Kapotas et al. 
[65] 
Compressed 
domain/ Inter 
frame 
prediction 
modes 
Low embedding 
capacity (at most 3960 
bits’ capacity with the 
bitrate variation 85% for 
20 scene change frames 
of luma component of 
resolution 176 × 144)  
Almost the same 
as compressed 
video 
Robust against 
H.264 
compression 
Scene change 
detector 
Not used 
Xu et al.  [66] Compressed 
domain/ Motion 
vectors 
Low embedding 
capacity (at most 537 
bits in 990 P-frame 
macroblocks, 4519 bits 
in 2640 B-frame 
macroblocks 
I-frame 35.22 
dB, P-frame 
34.61 dB, and 
B-frame 33.31 
dB 
Robust against 
MPEG 
compression 
Not used Not used 
Pan et al. [67] Compressed 
domain/ Motion 
vectors 
Low embedding 
capacity (at most 4 bits 
in 6 bits of high 
amplitude motion 
vectors and the 
modification of 2 bits) 
Average PSNR 
is 37.45 dB  
Robust against 
H.264 
compression 
Not used Not used 
Bin et al. [68]  Compressed 
domain/ Motion 
vectors 
Low embedding 
capacity (motion vector 
amplitude must exceed 
the threshold value and 
both components must 
not be equal) 
Average PSNR 
is 38.18 dB 
Robust against 
H.264 
compression 
Not used Not used 
Jue et al. [69] Compressed 
domain/ Motion 
vectors 
Low embedding 
capacity (at most 55 bits 
per P-frame or B-frames 
macroblocks. Largest 
amplitude of motion 
vectors is used)   
Average PSNR 
is 36.27 dB 
Robust against 
H.264/AVC 
compression 
 
Not used Not used 
Huang et al. 
[125] 
Compressed 
domain/ DCT 
coefficients 
Low embedding 
capacity (32 character 
per frame/image of 
resolution 352 × 288) 
Average PSNR 
is 44 dB 
Robust against 
StirMark 3.1 
attack (common 
signal processing 
operations) 
Not used BCH codes 
Barni et al. 
[126] 
Compressed 
domain/ DCT 
coefficients 
Low embedding 
capacity (at most 30 bits 
per video object of 500 
Kb/s) 
Almost the same 
as compressed 
video 
Robust against 
MPEG-4 
compression at 
lower bit rates and 
frame dropping 
Not used Not used 
Shahid et al. 
[70] 
Compressed 
domain/ QDCT 
coefficients 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 0.98% 
(at most 195 kbps or 20 
bits per macroblock) 
Average PSNR 
is 43.39 dB 
Robust against 
H.264/AVC codec 
Not used Not used 
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Thiesse et al. 
[71-73] 
Compressed 
domain/ QDCT 
coefficients 
The motion vector 
indices are embedded 
into QDCT coefficients 
of luma and chroma 
Almost the same 
as compressed 
video 
Robust against 
H.264/AVC 
compression 
Not used Not used 
Meuel et al. 
[74] 
Compressed 
domain/ QDCT 
coefficients 
An average of 25 Kbits 
per frame when the 
bitrate is 3828 Kbits/s  
 
Average PSNR 
is 47.71 dB 
when the bitrate 
is 3828 Kbits/s 
Robust against 
H.264 
compression 
RIO (skin 
detection) 
Not used 
Yilamz et al. 
[47] 
Compressed 
domain/ QDCT 
coefficients 
Intra frame: 8-13 bits of 
bit-length for 
resynchronization and 4 
bits of edge-direction for 
damage. Inter frame: 
MV row hides in a 
corresponding row of 
the next frame 
PSNR of Y: 36 
dB, U: 39.96 
dB, and V: 
41.24 dB when 
the bitrate is 500 
Kbits/s 
Robust against 
H.263+ codec 
Not used Not used 
Li et al. [127] Compressed 
domain/ DWT 
coefficients 
An average of 38 Kbits 
per frame of 
resolution 352 × 288 
when the first level of 
DWT is used 
Average PSNR 
is 35.50 dB 
when the first 
level of DWT is 
used 
Robust against 
JPEG/JPEG2000 
compression 
RIO (object 
detection by 
GMM) 
Not used 
Stanescu et 
al. [50] 
Compressed 
domain/ DCT 
coefficients 
Low embedding 
capacity (an average of 
1 bit per 8 × 8 block) 
N/A Robust against 
MPEG-2 codec 
Not used Not used 
Li et al. [75]  Compressed 
domain/ QDCT 
coefficients 
Low embedding 
capacity (at most 1 bit 
per 4 × 4 luma block) 
Average PSNR 
is 36 dB of Intra 
frame 
Robust against 
H.264 codec 
Not used Not used 
Ma et al. [76] 
 
Compressed 
domain/ QDCT 
coefficients 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 0.10% 
(at average 798 bits per 
Intra frame of 
resolution 176 × 144) 
Average PSNR 
is 40.74 dB of 
all Intra frames 
Robust against 
H.264/AVC codec 
Not used Not used 
Liu et al. [59] Compressed 
domain/ QDCT 
coefficients 
Low embedding 
capacity (at average 758 
bits per Intra frame of 
size  176 × 144 or 
15155 bits in 20 Intra 
frames) 
Average PSNR 
is 40.73 dB of 
all Intra frames 
Robust against 
H.264/AVC codec 
Not used Not used 
Liu et al. [78, 
79] 
Compressed 
domain/ QDCT 
coefficients 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 0.09% 
(at most 3541 bits are 
embedded in 20 Intra 
frames of resolution 
 176 × 144) 
Average PSNR 
is 46.35 dB of 
all Intra 
Robust against 
H.264/AVC codec 
Not used BCH codes 
Ke et al. [80] Compressed 
domain/ 
CAVLC 
Embedding rate 2.44% 
when QP=28 and video 
resolution is 352 × 288 
or 1 bit per 4 × 4 
residual block 
Average PSNR 
is 34.54 dB 
when QP=28 
and video 
resolution 
is 352 × 288  
Robust against 
H.264 
compression 
Not used Not used 
Liao et al. 
[81] 
Compressed 
domain/ 
CAVLC 
Low embedding 
capacity (at most 100 
bits are embedded in 
20th Intra frame of 
resolution 352 × 288) 
Average PSNR 
is 34.37 dB 
when video 
resolution is 
352 × 288 
Robust against 
H.264/AVC codec 
Not used Not used 
Lu et al. [82] Compressed 
domain/ 
CAVLC 
N/A Average PSNR 
is 37 dB  
Robust against 
MPEG-2 codec 
and geometric 
attacks 
Not used Not used 
Mobasseri et 
al. [128] 
Compressed 
domain/ 
CAVLC 
Low embedding 
capacity (an average of 
1 bit per 8 × 8 Intra 
block) 
Almost the same 
as compressed 
video 
Robust against 
MPEG-2 encoder 
Not used Not used 
Wang et al. 
[83] 
Compressed 
domain/ 
CABAC 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 0.57% 
(1156 bits are embedded 
in 50 frames of 
resolution 176 × 144) 
average PSNR is 
around 37.05 dB 
Robust against 
H.264/AVC codec 
Not used Not used 
Zhang et al. 
[85] 
Raw/ Spatial 
domain 
Embedding capacity is 
m× t bits per n = 2m −
1 bits block, where m >
2 and t = 2 or 3 
N/A Not robust against 
signal processing 
operations 
Not used BCH 
Cheddad et 
al. [86] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 0.08% 
Average PSNR 
is 61.22 dB 
Not robust against 
signal processing 
Skin region 
detection 
Not used 
Sadek et al. 
[87] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 0.23% 
Average PSNR 
is 54.64 dB 
Robust against 
MPEG-4 codec 
Skin region 
detection 
Not used 
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Khupse et al. 
[129] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Low embedding 
capacity only frame is 
used (2120 bits per 
video) 
Almost the same 
as original video 
Not robust against 
signal processing 
Skin region 
detection 
Not used 
Alavianmehr 
et al. [88] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 1.34% 
(4096 bits per video) 
Average PSNR 
is 36.97 dB  
Robust against 
H.264/AVC codec 
Not used Not used 
Moon et al. 
[130] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 12.5%  
N/A Not robust against 
signal processing 
Not used Encryption 
Kelash et al. 
[131] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 1.1% 
Average PSNR 
is 48.84 dB 
Not robust against 
signal processing 
Not used Not used 
Paul et al. 
[132] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity 8 bpp only in 
sudden scene change 
frames 
Almost the same 
as original video 
(frames that are 
sudden scenes) 
Not robust against 
signal processing  
Scene change 
detector 
Not used 
Bhole et al. 
[133] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 0.2% 
N/A Not robust against 
signal processing 
Not used Not used 
Hanafy et al. 
[134] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity 0.65 bpp  
Average PSNR 
is 51.35 dB 
Not robust against 
signal processing 
Randomization  Randomization 
Lou et al. 
[135] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 12% 
Average PSNR 
is 50.51 dB 
Robust against 
x2-detection and 
regular-singular  
Not used Not used 
Tadiparthi et 
al. [136] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 2% 
N/A Not robust against 
signal processing 
Not used Encryption 
Eltahir et al. 
[89] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity 8 bpp  
N/A Not robust against 
signal processing 
Not used Not used 
Dasgupta et 
al. [90] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity 8 bpp 
Average PSNR 
is 38.45 dB 
Not robust against 
signal processing 
Not used Not used 
Hu et al. 
[137] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity 1.5 bpp  
Average PSNR 
is 29.03 dB 
Not robust against 
signal processing 
Not used Non-uniform 
Rectangular 
Partition 
Kawaguchi et 
al. [91] 
Raw / Spatial 
domain 
At most the embedding 
capacity ratio is 41% 
when the threshold is 25 
N/A Not robust against 
signal processing  
BPCS Not used 
Sun [92] Raw / Spatial 
domain 
At most the embedding 
capacity ratio is 45% 
Average PSNR 
is 44.28 dB 
Not robust against 
signal processing 
BPCS Not used 
Patel et al. 
[93] 
Raw / 
Transform 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 12.5% 
Average PSNR 
is 31.23 dB  
Not robust against 
signal processing 
Not used Rijndael 256 
encryption 
Spaulding et 
al. [94] 
Raw / 
Transform 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratio is 25% 
Average PSNR 
is 33 dB  
Robust lossy 
compression 
BPCS Not used 
Noda et al. 
[95] 
Raw / 
Transform 
domain 
Average of embedding 
capacity ratios are 18% 
for 1 bit-plane and 28% 
for 2 bit-planes 
Average PSNR 
of 2 bit-planes 
are 42.55 dB 
  
Robust against 
3D-SPIHT and 
Motion-
JPEG2000 
compression 
BPCS Not used 
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CHAPTER 3: PROPOSED VIDEO STEGANOGRAPHY 
ALGORITHMS 
In this chapter, we propose six video steganography algorithms: 1) a highly secure 
video steganography algorithm based on ECC; 2) an increased payload video 
steganography algorithm in DWT domain based on ECC; 3) a novel video steganography 
algorithm based on KLT tracking and ECC; 4) a robust video steganography algorithm in 
the wavelet domain based on KLT tracking and ECC; 5) a new video steganography 
algorithm based on the multiple object tracking and ECC; and 6) a robust and secure 
video steganography algorithm in DWT-DCT domains based on multiple object tracking 
and ECC. The proposed algorithms provide solutions for the issues of less 
imperceptibility, low embedding capacity, less security, and less robustness against 
attacks, which exist in many steganographic algorithms, by adding some preprocessing 
stages and security levels to these algorithms. 
3.1 A Highly Secure Video Steganography Algorithm Based on ECC  
This algorithm uses an uncompressed video stream which is based on the frames 
as still images. First the video stream is separated into frames and each frame’s color 
space is converted to YCbCr. The reason for using YCbCr color space is that it removes 
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correlation between Red, Green, and Blue colors. This algorithm is divided into two 
phases.  
3.1.1 Data embedding phase 
Data embedding is the process of hiding a secret message inside cover videos. 
This process converts the video stream into frames. Each frame separates into the Y, U 
and V components of color space. For security purposes, the pixels’ positions of Y, U, 
and V components are shuffled by using a secret key (Key1). Figure 3.1 shows the 
process of shuffling YUV pixels. Also, characters of the secret message are converted 
into an array of binary bits. In order to change the bits’ positions of the secret message, 
the entire bits’ positions within the array are also shuffled using Key1. After shuffling, the 
array is divided into 4-bit blocks. Then, each block is encoded by the Hamming (7, 4, 1) 
and BCH (7, 4, 1) encoders. The outcome of the 7-bit encoded block (consists of 4-bit 
message and 3-bit parity) is XORed with the 7-bit number. These numbers are randomly 
generated by using another secret key (Key2). To select the locations for hiding the secret 
message into the frame components, Key2 is utilized. In other words, Key2 chooses 
random rows and columns for data embedding in each disordered Y, U, and V 
component.  
The embedding process is achieved by hiding each of encoded blocks into the 3-
2-2 LSB of the selected YUV pixels. The pixels of the YUV components will be 
repositioned to the original frame pixel positions to produce the stego frames. Finally, the 
stego video is constructed from these stego frames. The block diagram of the data 
embedding stage is illustrated in Figure 3.2.   
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Figure 3.1 The process of shuffling pixels in each Y, U, and V frame component by secret key. 
3.1.2 Data extracting phase  
Data extracting is the process of retrieving the secret message from the stego 
videos. This process is achieved by converting the distorted videos into frames. Then, 
each frame is partitioned into Y, U and V components. In every Y, U, and V component, 
the pixels’ positions are shuffled to the original positions by using secret Key1. The 
process of extracting the secret message from YUV components is accomplished by 
taking out 3-2-2 LSB in each selected pixel. The obtained message block will be XORed 
with the 7-bit number that is generated by using secret Key2. The outcomes of 7-bit 
groups are decoded by the Hamming (7, 4, 1) and BCH (7, 4, 1) decoder in order to 
produce 4-bit blocks. These blocks are stored into a binary array and the inverse of the 
permutation process will be applied on these blocks to produce original bits’ order. Then, 
the binary array of bits will be converted into the characters of the secret message. The 
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purpose of using two secret keys and the XOR operation is to improve the security and 
robustness of the proposed algorithm. Secret keys are only shared between sender and 
receiver, and used in both data embedding and extracting processes. The block diagram 
of the data extracting stage is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.2 Block diagram of the data embedding phase. 
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Figure 3.3 Block diagram of the data extracting phase. 
3.2 An Increased Payload Video Steganography Algorithm in DWT 
Domain Based on ECC 
In this algorithm, we use uncompressed video sequences based on the frames as 
still images. This method is illustrated by using two phases: 1) data embedding phase and 
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2) data extracting phase. Block diagrams of data embedding and extracting stages are 
illustrated in Figure 3.4. and 3.5, respectively. 
3.2.1 Data Embedding Phase 
The process of embedding the secret message consists of two stages: first encoding 
the message using the BCH code (Step 1 to 5) and then embedding the encoded message 
into the cover videos (Step 6 to 13). This process can be completed by the following steps: 
Step1: Input the secret message (text file). 
Step2: Change bits’ positions of the whole secret message by secret Key1. 
Step3: Convert the whole secret message to a one dimensional array (1-D).  
Step4: Encode the message by using the BCH (15, 11) encoder.  
Step5: XOR the encoded data, which consists of 15 bits (11 bits of message + 4 bits of 
parity), with the 15 bits of random value using secret Key2. 
Step6: Input the cover video stream. 
Step7: Convert the video sequence into a number of frames. 
Step8: Split each frame into the YUV color space.  
Step9: Apply the 2D-DWT individually on each Y, U, and V frame component.  
Step10: Embed the message into the middle and high frequency coefficients (LH, HL, and 
HH) of each of the Y, U, and V components as follows: 
?̂?𝑖𝑗 = {
𝐸[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑗_𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3), 𝑆]           𝑖𝑓 (𝑌𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0)  
𝐸[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(|𝑌𝑖𝑗_𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3|), 𝑆]       𝑖𝑓 (𝑌𝑖𝑗 < 0) 
                                 (3.1) 
?̂?𝑖𝑗 = {
𝐸[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(𝑈𝑖𝑗_𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3), 𝑆]         𝑖𝑓 (𝑈𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0)  
𝐸[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(|𝑈𝑖𝑗_𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3|), 𝑆]     𝑖𝑓 (𝑈𝑖𝑗 < 0) 
                                (3.2) 
?̂?𝑖𝑗 = {
𝐸[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(𝑉𝑖𝑗_𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3), 𝑆]         𝑖𝑓 (𝑉𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0)  
𝐸[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(|𝑉𝑖𝑗_𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3|), 𝑆]     𝑖𝑓 (𝑉𝑖𝑗 < 0) 
                                  (3.3) 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 , 𝑈𝑖𝑗 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑖𝑗  are the Y, U, and V coefficients, and S is the encoded secret 
message, 𝑆 = {000,… , 111}. E is the embedding process.  
Step11: Apply the inverse of 2D-DWT on the frame components.  
Step12: Rebuild the stego frames from the YUV stego components.  
Step13: Output the stego videos, which are reconstructed from all embedded frames. 
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Figure 3.4 Block diagram of the data embedding process. 
In this steganographic algorithm, two secret keys were used; each secret key was 
predefined by the sender and receiver in both embedding and the extracting processes. The 
first secret key (Key1) is used to randomly change the position of all bits in the secret 
message to make the message unreadable and chaotic before encoding by the BCH. The 
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second secret key (Key2) is used after the encoding process; the encoded message is 
divided into 15-bit groups, and each group is XORed with the 15-bit numbers (the 15-bit 
numbers were randomly generated). One of the strengths of the proposed algorithm is the 
usage of the two secret keys, which improve the security and robustness of our algorithm.  
3.2.2 Data Extracting Phase  
This section introduces the process of retrieving the encoded message from the 
stego videos first, and then decoding the encoded message using the BCH decoder. This 
process can be completed by the following steps:    
Step1:  Input the stego videos. 
Step2:  Convert the stego video sequences into a number of frames. 
Step3:  Divide each frame into the YUV color space.  
Step4:  Apply the 2D-DWT separately on each Y, U, and V component.  
Step5:  Extract the encoded message from the middle and high frequency coefficients (LH, 
HL, and HH) of each Y, U, and V component. 
?̂?1,2,3 = {
𝐸𝑋[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(?̂?𝑖𝑗_𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3)]    𝑖𝑓 (?̂?𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0)  
𝐸𝑋[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(|?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3|)]   𝑖𝑓 (?̂?𝑖𝑗 < 0) 
                              (3.4) 
?̂?1,2,3 = {
𝐸𝑋[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(?̂?𝑖𝑗_𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3)]    𝑖𝑓 (?̂?𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0)  
𝐸𝑋[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(|?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3|)]  𝑖𝑓 (?̂?𝑖𝑗 < 0) 
                             (3.5) 
?̂?1,2,3 = {
𝐸𝑋[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(?̂?𝑖𝑗_𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3)]     𝑖𝑓 (?̂?𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0)  
𝐸𝑋[𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(|?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑡1,2,3|)]   𝑖𝑓 (?̂?𝑖𝑗 < 0) 
                             (3.6) 
Where ?̂?𝑖𝑗 , ?̂?𝑖𝑗 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?𝑖𝑗  are the stego YUV coefficients, and ?̂? is the retrieved secret 
message. EX is the extracting process.  
Step6: Segment the entire encoded message into 15-bits groups.  
Step7: XOR each group with the random 15-bit numbers that were generated by the same 
secret key (Key2) at the sender side.  
Step8: Decode the message by the BCH (15, 11) decoder. 
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Step9: Produce an array from the resulted groups. 
Step10: Reposition the message again to the original bit order using secret Key1 
Step11: Output the secret message as a text file.  
 
Figure 3.5 Block diagram of the data extracting process. 
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3.3 A Novel Video Steganography Algorithm Based on KLT Tracking 
and ECC 
In this section, we propose a novel video steganographic method based on the 
KLT tracking algorithm using Hamming codes (15, 11). Algorithms 1 and 2 clarify the 
major steps of our embedding and extracting algorithms, respectively. Our proposed 
method is divided into four stages:  
3.3.1 Secret message preprocessing stage  
The secret message is a digital data type which is based on the ASCII of 
characters. Each character has a unique 8-bit code that is unchangeable. In this work, a 
sizable text file is used as a secret message, and it is preprocessed before the embedding 
phase. First, the whole characters in the text file are converted into ASCII codes in order 
to generate an array of binary bits. Then, for security purposes, the binary array is 
encrypted by using a secret key (Key1) that represents the size of the secret message. A 
shuffle encryption has been used to change the index of entire bits of the binary array. 
This process will encode the message, and protect it from hackers. Since the binary linear 
block of Hamming code (15, 11) is used, the encrypted array is divided into 11-bit 
blocks. Then, every block is encoded by the Hamming code (15, 11) that will generate 
15-bit blocks. Consequently, this encoder extends the size of the message by adding four 
parity bits into each block. Another secret key (Key2) is utilized as a seed to generate 
randomized 15-bit numbers, and each number is XORed with the 15-bit encoded block. 
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By using two secret keys, the Hamming codes, and XOR operation the security of our 
algorithm will be enhanced.   
3.3.2 Face detection and tracking stage 
At the beginning, the process of extracting the facial regions in the video frames 
must be identified because these regions are used as cover data for embedding the secret 
message. To detect the facial region in the first video frame, the Viola-Jones detector 
algorithm has been applied. Then, throughout the remaining video frames the face will be 
tracked by using the KLT tracking algorithm. Since our algorithm is based on the face 
detection and KLT tracking algorithms, the secret message will be hidden into only video 
frames that contain facial features. Otherwise non-facial frames will be discarded without 
embedding. Hiding secret messages inside facial regions make it more challenging for 
attackers during data extraction as these regions changes in every frame of the underlying 
video. The process of face detection and KLT tracking have been previously explained in 
Sections 2.8 and 2.9, respectively. 
3.3.3 Data embedding stage  
After the facial region is detected and tracked, it will be extracted from the video 
frames. In each frame, the cover data of this algorithm is the facial region of interest. The 
ROI changes in every frame based on the size of the facial bounding box. The ROI 
extracting process is not always accurate, and may include pixels outside the facial 
bounding box. For example, when the face is tilted, a binary mask is applied. This mask 
sets the pixels that are located inside the polygon bounding box to “1” and sets the pixels 
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outside the bounding polygon to “0”. The binary mask applies to all video frames. The 
main advantage of the binary mask is to determine the number of pixels and their 
positions that will involve in the embedding process of every frame. Figure 3.6 illustrates 
the role of the binary mask that identifies the facial region in each frame.  
 
Figure 3.6 Binary mask of one video frame. 
Every four edges of the bounding box in each frame are embedded into the 
specific non-facial area known by both sender and receiver. Every box needs 80 bits per 
frame (40 bits for X-axis and 40 bits for Y-axis). Moreover, in order to transmit keys to 
the receiver party, both keys will be embedded into the non-facial region of the first video 
frame. Then, the next stage in the process of embedding the hidden data begins. This 
stage hides the secret message blocks by placing them into the LSB of each red, green, 
and blue color components of the facial region in all video frames. In our algorithm, one 
LSB, two LSBs, three LSBs, and four LSBs of the three color components from each 
facial pixel are utilized in order to embed 3, 6, 9, and 12 bits of the hidden message, 
respectively. Upon completion, the stego frames will be reconstructed into a stego video 
format that sends via the communication channel to the receiver party. Figure 3.7 
illustrates the block diagram of data embedding stage. 
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Algorithm 1: Data embedding of the proposed algorithm  
Input: V //Video, M //Secret message in characters, Key1, Key2; //Stego keys 
Output: SV; //Stego video 
Initialize km, pm,p; 
B ← M; //Convert the alphabetic secret message to the binary array 
// Stego keys  
Key1 ← Length(B)/11; //Length of the secret message 
Key2 ← rand (2^15,Key1,1)';  //Randomization of the seed Key1 
EB ← E(B, [Key1]);  //Encrypt the binary array by Key1 
 
for1 i = 1: (Key1*15) do //Encode each 11 bits of encoded message by Hamming 
(15,11)  
      g(1:11) ← get(EB(km:km+11)); 
      E_EB ←  encode(g,15,11); 
      temp(1:15) ← get(Key2(i)); 
      Ecdmsg(pm:pm+15) ← xor(E_EB,temp); 
      pm+15; km+11; 
end1 
Read (V); //Read input video, {Vf1, Vf2,…, Vfn} are video frames (n frames) 
FBox1 ← Face_detector (Vf1); //Calling the Viola-Jones face detector for first 
frame Vf1 
Non_Face(Vf1) ← Key1, Key2; //Embed keys (Key1 and Key2) into the non-facial 
regions of the first frame Vf1 
 
for2 t = 1:n do  //For each video frame, track the face and its corner box points 
FBoxt ← Face_KLT(Vft); //Calling KLT face tracking algorithm 
Non_Face(Vft )← Edges (FBoxt(xz,yz));  //Embed edge points of each facial box into 
the non-facial area of its frame (z=1,2,3, and 4) 
B_mat = mask(Edges (FBoxt(xz,yz)),Vfx,Vfy);  //Identify the binary mask of the 
facial regions of size (Vfx,Vfy)     
  //Embed the encoded message into the 1 LSB, 2 LSBs, 3 LSBs, or 4 LSBs of each 
frame’s facial region (FBox1,2,…n) 
    for3 i = 1:Vfx do 
        for4 j= 1:Vfy do 
           if5 B_mat(i,j) == 1 
             LSB_R1,2,3, or 4(FBoxt(i,j)) ←  Ecdmsg(p+1,4,7, or 10); 
             LSB_G1,2,3, or 4(FBoxt(i,j)) ←  Ecdmsg(p+2,5,8, or 11); 
             LSB_B1,2,3, or 4(FBoxt(i,j)) ←  Ecdmsg(p+3,6,9, or 12); 
                         p+3,6,9, or 12;  
     end5  end4  end3  
end2 
 
get SV //Obtain the stego video 
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Figure 3.7 Block diagram for the data embedding stage. 
3.3.4 Data extraction stage 
At the receiver side, the stego video will be divided into frames, and both two 
secret keys are extracted from the non-facial area of the first frame. Moreover, in each 
video frame, the four corner points of the facial box will be extracted from the non-facial 
regions. The binary mask of each frame is generated from these points, and the exact 
facial region will be identified. Then, the process of extracting the hidden message is 
conducted by taking out the 3, 6, 9, and 12 bits from first LSB, second LSBs, third LSBs, 
and fourth LSBs, respectively, in each facial pixel of all video frames. The extracted bits 
from all video frames are stored in a binary array. The binary array will be segmented 
into the 15-bit blocks. Each block will be XORed with the 15-bit number that was 
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randomly generated by secret Key2. The results of 15-bit blocks are decoded using the 
Hamming (15, 11) decoder to produce 11-bit blocks. Since the sender has encrypted the 
secret message, the obtained array must be decrypted using secret Key1. The final array 
divides into 8-bit codes (ASCII) for generating the right characters of the original 
message. Figure 3.8 illustrates the block diagram of the data extracting stage.  
Algorithm 2: Data extracting of the proposed algorithm 
Input: SV; //Stego video 
Output: M; //Secret message in characters  
Initialize km, pm,p; 
{Sf1, Sf2,…, Sfn} ← Read (SV);//Convert the stego video into frames (n stego frames) 
Extract[Key1, Key2] from (Sf1); //Extract keys (Key1 and Key2) from the non-facial 
region of the first stego frame Sf1 
for1 t = 1:n do 
Extract[Edges (FBoxt(xz,yz))] from (Non_Face(Sft )); //Extract edge points of each 
facial box FBox from non-facial areas of its stego frame (z=1,2,3, and 4) 
Extract[FBoxt] from (Sft); //Identify the region of interest (facial region) by edges 
B_mat = mask(Edges (FBoxt(xz,yz)),Sfx,Sfy); //Identify the binary mask of facial 
regions of size (Sfx,Sfy)      
//Extract the encoded message from the 1 LSB, 2 LSBs, 3 LSBs, or 4 LSBs of each frame’s 
facial region (FBox1,2,…n) 
   for2 i = 1:Sfx do 
        for3 j= 1:Sfy do 
            if4 B_mat(i,j) == 1 
               Ecdmsg(p+1,4,7, or 10) ←  LSB_R1,2,3, or 4(FBoxt(i,j)); 
               Ecdmsg(p+2,5,8, or 11) ←  LSB_G1,2,3, or 4 (FBoxt(i,j)); 
               Ecdmsg(p+3,6,9, or 12) ←  LSB_B1,2,3, or 4 (FBoxt(i,j)); 
                    p+3,6,9, or 12; 
    end4  end3  end2  end1 
for5 i = 1: (Key1*15) do //Decode each 15 bits of extracted data by Hamming (15,11)  
      Sg(1:15) ← get(Ecdmsg (km:km+15)); 
      temp(1:15) ← get(Key2(i));  
      E_EB   ← xor(Sg,temp)       
      EB ←  decode(E_EB ,15,11); 
      pm+11; km+15; 
end5 
B ← D(EB, [Key1]); //Decrypt the binary array by Key1  
M ← B; //Convert the binary array to the alphabetic characters   
get M; //Recover the secret message 
73 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Block diagram for the data extracting stage. 
3.4 A Robust Video Steganography Algorithm in the Wavelet Domain 
Based on KLT Tracking and ECC 
In this section, we introduce a video steganography algorithm in the wavelet 
domain based on the KLT tracking algorithm and BCH codes (15, 11, 1). Our proposed 
steganography algorithm has four phases: 
3.4.1 Secret Message Preprocessing Phase  
In this work, a large size text file has been used as a secret message, and it is 
preprocessed before the embedding phase. Here, the whole characters in the text file are 
converted into ASCII codes in order to generate an array of binary bits. Then, for security 
purposes, the binary array is encrypted by using a secret key (Key1) that represents the 
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size of the secret message. This process will encode the message and protect it from 
attackers. Since the binary linear block of BCH codes (15, 11, 1) are used, the encrypted 
array is divided into 11-bit blocks. Then, every block is encoded by the BCH codes (15, 
11, 1) producing 15-bit blocks. The size of the message is extended by adding four parity 
bits into each block. Another secret key (Key2) is utilized to generate randomized 15-bit 
numbers, and each number is XORed with the 15-bit encoded block. The security of our 
algorithm will be improved by using two keys, BCH codes, and XOR operation. 
3.4.2 Face Detection and Tracking Phase 
First, the process of extracting the facial regions in the video frames must be 
identified since facial regions are used as cover data. The Viola-Jones detector algorithm 
is applied in order to detect the facial region in the first video frame. Then, the KLT 
tracking algorithm is used throughout the remaining video frames in order to track the 
facial regions. Sections 2.8 and 2.9 have previously discussed face detection and tracking 
using KLT algorithm. 
3.4.3 Data Embedding Phase  
In each video frame, the cover data of our algorithm is the facial region of 
interest. The facial regions will be extracted from the video frames after they are detected 
and tracked. The region of interest changes in every frame based on the size of the facial 
bounding box. In each video frame, the 2D-DWT is applied on each R, G, and B color 
components of the facial region producing LL, LH, HL, and HH sub-bands. Then, the 
secret message is embedded into the LH, HL, and HH coefficients of the facial region in 
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all video frames. Once this stage is completed, the secret keys and facial box edges are 
hidden into the non-facial areas. Every four edges of the bounding box in each frame are 
embedded into the specific non-facial area known by both transmitter and receiver. The 
length of each facial box is 80 bits per frame (40 bits for each X-axis and Y-axis). 
Moreover, in order to transmit keys to the receiver party, both secret keys will be 
embedded into the non-facial region of the first video frame. Upon completion, the stego 
frames will be reconstructed in order to produce the stego video format that transmits via 
the communication channel to the receiver party. Figure 3.9 illustrates the block diagram 
of data embedding phase. 
 
Figure 3.9 Block diagram for the data embedding phase. 
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3.4.4 Data Extraction Phase  
The process of the data extracting phase is illustrated in Figure 3.10. In order to 
retrieve a secret message correctly, the stego video is divided into frames through the 
receiver, and two secret keys are extracted from the non-facial area of the first frame. In 
addition, in each video frame, the four edge points of the facial box are extracted from the 
non-facial region. Thus, the exact facial region is identified in each video frame. Then, 
the 2D-DWT is applied on each of the R, G, and B color components of the facial box in 
order to generate the LL, LH, HL, and HH sub-bands.  
 
Figure 3.10 Block diagram for the data extracting phase. 
Then, the process of extracting the hidden message is conducted by taking out the 
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facial region. The extracted bits from all video frames are stored in a binary array. The 
binary array is divided into the 15-bit blocks. Each block will be XORed with the 15-bit 
number randomly generated by secret Key2. The results of the 15-bit blocks are decoded 
using the BCH (15, 11, 1) decoder to produce 11-bit blocks. Since the sender has 
encrypted the secret message, the obtained array is decrypted using secret Key1. The final 
array is divided into an 8-bit code (ASCII) in order to generate the right characters of the 
original message. 
3.5 A New Video Steganography Algorithm Based on the Multiple 
Object Tracking and ECC 
In this section, we present a new video steganography algorithm based on the 
multiple object tracking algorithm and Hamming codes (15, 11). Our proposed 
steganography is divided into the following four stages:  
3.5.1 Secret Message Preprocessing Stage  
In this work, a large size text file is used as a secret message, and it is 
preprocessed before the embedding stage. Here, the whole characters in the text file are 
converted into ASCII codes in order to generate an array of binary bits. Then, for security 
purposes, the binary array is encrypted by using a secret key (Key1) that represents the 
size of the secret message. This process will encode the message and protect it from 
attackers. Since the binary linear block of Hamming codes (15, 11) are used, the 
encrypted array is divided into 11-bit blocks. Then, every block is encoded by the 
Hamming codes (15, 11) that will produce 15-bit blocks. The size of the message is 
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extended by adding four parity bits into each block. Another secret key (Key2) is utilized 
to generate randomized 15-bit numbers, and each number is XORed with the 15-bit 
encoded block. The security of the proposed algorithm will be improved by using two 
secret keys, Hamming codes, and XOR operation. 
3.5.2 Motion-Based Multiple Object Tracking Stage 
The motion-based multiple object tracking algorithm has been previously 
explained in Section 2.10. In this stage, the process of identifying the moving objects in 
the video frames must be performed since motion object regions are used as cover data. 
This process is achieved by detecting each moving object within an individual frame, and 
then associating these detections throughout all of the video frames. The background 
subtraction method is applied to detect the moving objects. Then, the Kalman filter is 
used to predict estimation trajectory of each moving object. 
3.5.3 Data Embedding Stage  
In each video frame, the cover data of the proposed algorithm is the motion 
objects that are considered as regions of interest. The motion regions are identified 
through the video frames after they are detected and tracked. The region of interest 
changes in every frame based on the size and the number of the moving objects. The 
motion-based multiple object tracking algorithm is applied in order to predict trajectories 
of all moving objects. In each video frame, the background subtraction method is 
administered to generate a foreground mask which will determine the regions of the 
moving objects. Then, the R, G, and B components of each motion object’s pixels are 
79 
 
used for embedding purposes. In our algorithm, one LSB and two LSBs are utilized in 
order to embed 3 and 6 bits of the secret message in each motion pixel. Moreover, in 
order to transmit secret keys to the receiver party, both keys are embedded into the non-
motion region of the first video frame. Upon completion, the stego frames will be 
reconstructed in order to produce the stego video format that transmits via the 
communication medium to the receiver party. Figure 3.11 shows the block diagram of the 
data embedding stage. 
 
Figure 3.11 Block diagram of the data embedding stage of the proposed algorithm.  
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3.5.4 Data Extraction Stage  
The process of the data extracting stage is illustrated in Figure 3.12. In order to 
retrieve a secret message correctly, the stego video is divided into frames through the 
receiver, and then two secret keys are extracted from the non-motion region of the first 
frame. To predict trajectories of motion objects, the motion-based multiple object 
tracking algorithm is applied again by the receiver. Moreover, in each video frame, a 
foreground mask that is similar to the embedding stage’s mask is produced by using the 
background subtraction method.  
 
Figure 3.12 Block diagram of the data extraction stage of the proposed algorithm.  
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object’s pixels of all the video frames. The extracted bits from all the video frames are 
stored in a binary array. The binary array is divided into 15-bit blocks. Each block will be 
XORed with the 15-bit number randomly generated by secret Key2. The results of the 15-
bit blocks are decoded by using the Hamming (15, 11) decoder to produce 11-bit blocks. 
Since the sender has encrypted the secret message, the obtained array is decrypted by 
using secret Key1. The final array is divided into an 8-bit code (ASCII) in order to 
generate the right characters of the original message. 
3.6 A Robust and Secure Video Steganography Method in DWT-DCT 
Domains Based on Multiple Object Tracking and ECC 
In this section, a robust and secure video steganography algorithm in DWT-DCT 
domains based on MOT and ECC is presented. The major stages of the proposed video 
steganography framework are illustrated in Figure 3.13. A sizeable text data is utilized as s 
secret messages, and it is preprocessed prior the data embedding interval, which is 
ciphered and coded by Hamming and BCH (7, 4) codes. Figure 3.14 illustrates the 
process of securing input messages prior the embedding stage. The proposed 
steganographic algorithm is separated into the three stages: 
3.6.1 Motion-Based MOT Stage 
The motion-based MOT algorithm has previously discussed in Section 2.10. The 
process of identifying the moving objects in the video frames must be carried out when 
motion object regions are utilized as host data. This process is achieved by detecting each 
moving object within an individual frame, and then associating these detections 
82 
 
throughout all of the video frames. The background subtraction method is applied to 
detect the moving objects based on the GMM. It also computes the differences between 
consecutive frames that generate the foreground mask. Then, the Kalman filter is 
employed to predict estimation trajectory of each moving region.  
 
Figure 3.13 The proposed video steganography framework. 
3.6.2 Data Embedding Stage  
In entire video frames, the host data of our proposed method is the motion objects 
that are considered as regions of interest. By using the motion-based MOT algorithm, the 
process of detecting and tracking the motion regions over all video frames are achieved. 
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The regions of interest altered in each video frame is dependent on the number and the 
size of the moving objects. In every frame, 2D-DWT is implemented on RGB channels of 
each motion region resulting LL, LH, HL, and HH subbands. In addition, 2D-DCT is also 
applied on the same motion regions generating DC and AC coefficients. Thereafter, the 
secret messages are concealed into LL, LH, HL, and HH of DWT coefficients, and into 
DC and AC of DCT coefficients of each motion object separately based on its foreground 
mask.  Furthermore, both secret keys are transmitted to the receiver side by embedding 
them into the non-motion area of the first frame. Upon accomplishment, the stego video 
frames are rebuild in order to construct the stego video that can be transmitted through 
the unsecure medium to the receiver. Algorithm 3 clarifies the major steps of our 
embedding algorithm. 
 
Figure 3.14 Process of encrypting and encoding input messages. 
3.6.3 Data Extraction Stage  
In order to recover hidden messages accurately, the embedded video is separated 
into a number of frames through the receiver side, and then two secret keys are obtained 
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objects, the motion-based MOT algorithm is applied again by the receiver. Then, 2D-
DWT and 2D-DCT are employed on the RGB channels of each motion object in order to 
create LL, LH, HL, and HH subbands, and DC and AC coefficients, respectively. 
Algorithm 3: Data Embedding Stage 
Input: V //Video, M //Secret message in characters, Key1, Key2; //Secret keys 
Output: SV; //Output of Stego videos 
Initialize km1, pm1, p1; 
Bin ← Msm; //Change the text message to binary vector 
Key1 ← Len(Bin)/4; //Size of the hidden messages 
Key2 ← rand (2^7, Key1,1)'; //Randomizing the secret Key1 
EnB ← En(Bin, [Key1]);  //Ciphering the binary vector by Key1 
for1 i = 1: (Key1*7) do //Encode each 4 bits of secret message by Hamming and BCH (7,4)  
      g(1:4) ← get(EnB(km1:km1+4)); 
      En_EnB ← encode(g,7,4); 
      tem(1:7) ← get(Key2(i)); 
      Encdmsg(pm1:pm1+7) ← xor(En_EnB,tem); 
      pm1+7; km1+4; 
end1 
{Vf1, Vf2,…, Vfn}x ← V; //Video V is divided into n frames. 
MODTBox ← MODT(Vf); //Calling the Motion Object Detection and Tracking for each 
video frame Vf. 
Non_Motion(Vf1) ← Key1, Key2; //Embed keys (Key1 and Key2) into the non-motion areas of 
the first frame Vf1. 
FMask = mask(Vf); //Identify the foreground mask of each motion region in Vf frame of 
size (Vfx, Vfy). 
[CoeffR, CoeffG, CoeffB] ← DWT/DCT (MODTBox); //Applying 2D-DWT and 2D-DCT 
separately on each motion object for RGB frame components 
//Conceal the secret messages into coefficients of R, G, and B for each motion object. 
    for2 i = 1:Vfx do 
        for3 j= 1:Vfy do 
           if4 FMask(i,j) == 1 
             CoeffR1,2, or 3 ← Encdmsg(p1+1,4, or7); 
             CoeffG1,2, or 3 ← Encdmsg(p1+2,5, or 8); 
             CoeffB1,2, or 3 ← Encdmsg(p1+3,6, or 9); 
                         p1+3,6, or 9;  
      end4 end3 end2  
SVf ← IDWT/IDCT (CoeffR, CoeffG, CoeffB); //Applying 2D-IDWT and 2D-IDCT 
separately on each component coefficients to produce the stego frame. 
SV ← {SVf1, SVf2,…, SVfn}x; //Obtain the stego video 
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Next, the extracting process of the embedded data is achieved by obtaining the 
secret messages from LL, LH, HL, HH, DC, and AC coefficients of each motion region 
over all video frames based on the same foreground masks used in the embedding stage. 
The extracted secret message is decoded by Hamming and BCH (7, 4), and then decrypted 
to obtain the original message. The essential steps of data extracting algorithm are shown 
in the Algorithm 4. 
Algorithm 4: Data Extracting Stage 
Input: SV; //Input Stego videos 
Output: Msm; //Secret text data in characters  
Initialize km1, pm1, p1; 
{Sf1, Sf2,…, Sfn} ← SV; //Stego Video SV is divided into n frames 
Extract[Key1, Key2] from (Sf1);  //Extract keys (Key1 and Key2) from the non-motion areas of 
the first embedded frame Sf1 
MODTBox ← MODT(SVf); //Calling the Motion Object Detection and Tracking for each 
stego frame SVf. 
FMask = mask(SVf); //Identify the foreground mask of each motion region in SVf frame of 
size (SVfx, SVfy). 
[CoeffR, CoeffG, CoeffB] ← DWT/DCT (MODTBox); //Applying 2D-DWT and 2D-DCT 
separately on each motion object in RGB stego frame.  
//Recover the secret messages from the coefficients of R, G, and B for each motion object. 
   for1 i = 1:Sfx do 
        for2 j= 1:Sfy do 
            if3 FMask(i,j) == 1 
               Encdmsg(p1+1,4, or 7) ←  CoeffR1,2, or 3 ; 
               Encdmsg(p1+2,5, or 8) ←  CoeffG1,2, or 3 ; 
               Encdmsg(p1+3,6, or 9) ←  CoeffB1,2, or 3 ; 
                    P1+3,6, or 9; 
        end3 end2 end1 
for4 i = 1: (Key1*7) do //Decode each 7 bits of retrieved data by Hamming and BCH (7,4).  
      Sg(1:7) ← get(Encdmsg (km1:km1+7)); 
      tem(1:7) ← get(Key2(i));  
      En_EnB   ← xor(Sg,tem)       
      EnB ← decode(En_EnB ,7,4); 
      Pm1+4; km1+7; 
end4 
Bin ← D(EnB, [Key1]);  //Decipher the binary vector by Key1  
Msm ← Bin; //Alter the binary vector to the text data.  
get Msm   //Obtain secret messages 
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
4.1 A Highly Secure Video Steganography Algorithm Based on ECC 
A database of nine standard Common Interchange Format (CIF) video sequences 
is used, with the size (288 x 352) and the format 4:2:0 YUV. All video sequences are 
equal in length with 300 frames in each one. A large text file is used as a secret message. 
The MATLAB software program is used to implement this work and test our experiment 
results.   
In Figure 4.1, an example of one frame (frame number 111) in the Foreman video 
is chosen. The first part of the figure shows that the three components of the 111th frame 
are separated. Then it shows some locations that have been selected randomly for the 
secret message. The embedded locations are different in each component inside one 
frame and they differ from one frame to next, which mainly depends on the secret key. 
The second part of the figure shows frame number 111 before and after the embedding 
process. 
In Table 4.1, the average PSNR for all video sequences is shown for each Y, U, 
and V component and all are greater than 51 dB. The quality of the stego videos are 
mostly the same as the original videos. Figure 4.2 shows the PSNRs of 300 stego frames 
in the Mother-daughter video. The qualities of the results that have been obtained from 
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our proposal are very close to the quality of the original videos before embedding. In 
general, PSNRs are greater than 51 dBs, and the V component has a better quality among 
the three components.  
 
Figure 4.1 A sample result of frame number 111 for the Foreman video. a) shows the selected areas for 
embedding in YUV components for frame number 111, b) shows the 111th frame both the original and the 
stego frames.    
Figure 4.3 shows the comparison of visual quality between nine stego videos. The 
PSNR of each component, Y, U, and V, is calculated, of which the average is 300 frames 
per video. All the results of PSNRs are between 51 and 52.5 dBs, which are considered 
very good results with regard to the purpose of quality. 
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Figure 4.2 PSNR of 300 stego frames for the Mother-daughter video. 
Table 4.2 shows the experimental results of the proposed algorithm and other five 
methods based on embedding capacity, visual quality, cover video preprocessing, and 
secret message preprocessing. Our algorithm clearly dominates the five existing 
algorithms by attaining highest values of the PSNR and hidden ratio (HR). 
 
Figure 4.3 Comparison between the averages of the PSNR Y, U, and V components for nine videos. 
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Table 4.1 The average PSNR of Y, U, and V for all video sequences. 
Sequences Frame No. PSNRY PSNRU PSNRV 
Foreman 
1-100 51.901 51.940 51.920 
101-200 51.857 51.924 52.049 
201-300 51.817 52.059 52.038 
Akiyo 
1-100 51.881 51.988 52.431 
101-200 51.859 51.978 52.458 
201-300 51.859 51.943 52.428 
Coastguard 
1-100 51.835 51.664 51.854 
101-200 51.824 51.682 51.806 
201-300 51.823 51.655 51.795 
Container 
1-100 51.821 52.146 52.067 
101-200 51.806 52.117 52.008 
201-300 51.785 52.056 51.970 
Hall 
1-100 51.787 52.084 52.021 
101-200 51.797 52.079 52.016 
201-300 51.785 52.063 52.005 
Mobile 
1-100 51.862 52.127 52.065 
101-200 51.829 52.076 52.074 
201-300 51.834 52.064 52.072 
Mother-daughter 
1-100 51.686 51.857 51.995 
101-200 51.702 51.868 51.992 
201-300 51.687 51.876 51.946 
News 
1-100 52.027 52.167 51.781 
101-200 52.012 52.139 51.769 
201-300 51.998 52.135 51.764 
Stefan 
1-100 51.885 52.082 51.961 
101-200 51.810 52.111 51.964 
201-300 51.848 52.081 51.904 
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Table 4.2 Performance comparison of the proposed algorithm with existing five methods. 
Method HR PSNR 
Video 
Preprocessing 
Message 
Preprocessing 
Chang et al. [53] 1.04% 37.00 dB    
Ma et al. [58]  0.10% 40.74 dB   
Wang et al. [83] 0.57% 37.05 dB   
Ke et al. [80] 2.44% 34.54 dB   
Alavianmehr et al. [88] 1.34% 36.97 dB    
Proposed algorithm 7.39% 51.75 dB       
4.2 An Increased Payload Video Steganography Algorithm in DWT 
Domain Based on ECC 
In this section, the performance of our second algorithm is evaluated through 
several experiments. The experimental environment utilizes several variables: the cover 
data comprise a dataset consisting of seven video sequences of CIF type; also, the format 
of YUV is 4:2:0. In addition, the resolution of each video is (352 × 288), and all videos 
are equal in length with 300 frames. A large text file is used as a secret message. The 
results are implemented using both fast and slow motion videos. In Figure 4.4, the PSNR 
of the Y-components are calculated for all seven videos. The results of the PSNR-Y for 
the Akiyo, Container, Bus, and Foreman videos are more stable, while in the Soccer and 
Tennis videos, the quality is frequently changing. The reason for varying the visual quality 
is because the sporting videos contain faster motion objects than the others. Overall, the 
Akiyo video has the best visual quality.  
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Figure 4.4 PSNR comparisons for the Y-components of all videos. 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the PSNR of the U-component and the V-component, 
respectively, for all seven videos. In the first figure, the demonstrated results of the PSNR-
U for the Akiyo and Container videos are changing slightly from one frame to other, as 
compared to other five videos. The PSNR-U of the Coastguard video has the highest dBs 
among the group. In the second figure, the PSNR-V for all video streams has been 
calculated; the Coastguard and Soccer videos have a better quality.  In Figure 4.7, the 
average PSNR comparison for 300 frames of each video is shown. The comparison shows 
that the result of the visual quality for each of the Akiyo, Container, Bus, and Foreman 
videos ranged between 40.44 – 42.05 dBs; these videos all contain slower motion objects 
while the PSNR of the Coastguard, Soccer, and Tennis videos change frequently over 
time (ranges between 37.64 – 44.23 dB). The changes occur because these videos contain 
faster motion objects that lead to unstable visual quality.  
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Figure 4.5 PSNR comparisons for the U-component of all videos. 
 
Figure 4.6 PSNR comparisons for the V-component of all videos. 
Table 4.3 shows the average of the PSNR for each Y, U, and V component for all 
video sequences. The visual quality of each part is measured separately by averaging each 
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of the 100 frames per video. The average results’ are different and depend on both the type 
of videos and the speed of the motion object. 
In Table 4.4, there are five videos of both fast and slow motion objects (the 
Soccer, Tennis, and Coastguard have fast motion objects; the Akiyo and Container videos 
have slow motion objects). Part (a) of the table shows the stego frame that has the lowest 
PSNR and its original frame in each video. Part (b) of the table indicates the stego frame 
that has the highest PSNR and its original frame in each video. It can be observed that the 
minimum and maximum PSNR of the videos that have slow motion objects are very close 
to one another, as in the Akiyo and Container videos. However, the minimum and 
maximum PSNR of the videos that have fast motion objects are different in dBs range such 
as the Soccer, Tennis, and Coastguard videos. Overall, the objective quality of both video 
types is considerable. 
 
Figure 4.7 PSNR comparisons for 300 frames of all videos. 
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Table 4.3 The average PSNR for each Y, U, and V component for all seven videos. 
Video Sequences Frame Number PSNRY PSNRU PSNRV 
Akiyo 
1-100 46.299 38.104 45.122 
101-200 44.787 36.681 43.663 
201-300 43.405 35.121 42.192 
Coastguard 
1-100 42.626 47.666 48.490 
101-200 41.064 45.054 46.126 
201-300 39.148 42.858 44.677 
Container 
1-100 40.923 43.632 42.153 
101-200 39.365 42.171 40.752 
201-300 37.942 40.812 39.434 
Bus 
1-100 39.161 42.687 43.318 
101-200 36.902 40.916 42.563 
201-300 36.330 40.237 41.917 
Soccer 
1-100 43.929 44.447 46.387 
101-200 40.471 42.357 45.349 
201-300 48.663 41.907 44.579 
Foreman 
1-100 42.706 43.989 44.525 
101-200 41.374 41.982 42.532 
201-300 39.870 40.409 41.065 
Tennis 
1-100 41.452 43.694 39.421 
101-200 38.278 36.114 34.966 
201-300 33.038 36.050 35.783 
On the other hand, according to [123], this algorithm has a high embedding 
payload. The obtained hiding ratio is 28.12%. A reasonable tradeoff is noticed between 
the amount of the embedded message in each video (12.23 Mbytes) and the quality (37.64 
- 44.23 dBs). A number of experiments were conducted to compare the embedding 
capacity of our algorithm and the embedding capacity of both the LSB algorithm and [88]. 
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Table 4.5 shows the comparison between the three algorithms, according to the amount of 
secret data in each frame.  
Table 4.4 Minimum and maximum PSNR frames for each of five videos. 
Minimum PSNR Maximum PSNR 
Original Frames Stego frames Original Frames Stego  frames 
    
74th in Akiyo PSNR 41.44 dB 107th of Akiyo 
PSNR 41.95 dB 
 
    
26th in Container 
 
PSNR 40.63 dB 143rd in Container PSNR 40.99 dB 
    
2nd in Soccer 
PSNR 41.68 dB 
 
136th in Soccer PSNR 47.43 dB 
    
86th in Tennis PSNR 34.99 dB 39th in Tennis 
PSNR 41.08 dB 
 
    
90th in Coastguard PSNR 43.24 dB 72nd in Coastguard 
PSNR 47.00 dB 
 
a) b) 
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Table 4.5 Embedding capacity comparison of our algorithm with both Alavianmehr and LSB Algorithms. 
Video 
Resolution 
YUV 
Proposed 
Algorithm 
(Bits/Frame) 
Alavianmehr et al. 
(Bits/Frame) 
LSB Algorithm 
(Bits/Frame) 
176 X 144 
 
Y 57024 4096 25344 
U 14256 Not used 6336 
V 14256 Not used 6336 
352 X 288 
 
Y 228096 8192 101376 
U 57024 Not used 25344 
V 57024 Not used 25344 
This algorithm has improved the embedding capacity of [88] and the LSB 
algorithm by approximately 41.7 and 2.2 times, respectively, without visual quality 
degradation. Figure 4.8 shows the embedding capacity improvement of our algorithm. 
Table 4.6 shows the experimental results of our method and the other five methods based 
on embedding capacity, visual quality, cover video preprocessing, and secret message 
preprocessing. The proposed method obviously outperforms the five existing methods by 
obtaining highest values of the PSNR and HR.   
 
Figure 4.8 Comparison of the proposed algorithm with [88] and LSB. 
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Table 4.6 Performance comparison of the proposed method with existing five methods. 
Method HR PSNR 
Video 
Preprocessing 
Message 
Preprocessing 
Chang et al. [53] 1.04% 37.00 dB    
Ma et al. [76] 0.10% 40.74 dB   
Wang et al. [83] 0.57% 37.05 dB   
Ke et al. [80] 2.44% 34.54 dB   
Alavianmehr et al. [88] 1.34% 36.97 dB    
Proposed algorithm 28.12% 41.58 dB       
Finally, the robustness of our method is tested under different types of attacks 
(Gaussian noise with the zero mean and variance=0.01 and 0.001, Salt & pepper noise 
with the density=0.01 and 0.001, and median filtering). To achieve the robustness of the 
algorithm, the higher Sim and the lower BER must be obtained.  Table 4.7 illustrates the 
performance of the proposed algorithm under attacks while it retrieves the hidden data 
with a high Sim and a low BER.   
Table 4.7 Performance of the proposed algorithm under attacks. 
Type of Attack 
Akiyo Bus Coastguard Container Foreman Soccer Tennis 
Sim 
BER 
% 
Sim 
BER 
% 
Sim 
BER 
% 
Sim 
BER 
% 
Sim 
BER 
% 
Sim 
BER 
% 
Sim 
BER 
% 
No attacks 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
(Salt & 
Pepper) 
Density= 
0.01 0.955 4.5 0.965 3.5 0.945 5.5 0.975 2.5 0.965 3.5 0.923 7.7 0.921 7.9 
0.001 0.963 3.7 0.973 2.7 0.953 4.7 0.983 1.7 0.959 4.1 0.932 6.8 0.933 6.7 
(Gaussian 
white) 
Variance= 
0.01 0.923 7.7 0.933 6.7 0.913 8.7 0.943 5.7 0.919 8.1 0.902 9.8 0.901 9.9 
0.001 0.909 9.1 0.919 8.1 0.899 10.1 0.929 7.1 0.898 10.2 0.874 12.6 0.865 13.5 
Median filtering 0.986 1.4 0.987 1.3 0.986 1.4 0.998 0.2 0.975 2.5 0.959 4.1 0.961 3.9 
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The proposed algorithm not only achieved a high embedding capacity of the secret 
message but also improved the secrecy of hidden data. This is mainly because two secret 
keys and BCH (15, 11) code had been used prior to the embedding process to produce the 
unreadable message to safeguard it against attackers.  
4.3 A Novel Video Steganography Algorithm Based on KLT Tracking 
and ECC 
This section presents experimental results that are implemented by the MATLAB 
software version R2013a. A dataset of five videos (Video1, Video2, Video3, Video4, and 
Video5) with the format of audio video interleave (AVI) are used. The implemented 
videos are videoconferencing sequences taken by the laptop camera (from the computer 
vision MATLAB toolbox). The cover videos have a 640x480 pixel resolution at 30 
frames per second, and a data rate of 8856 kbps. Each video contains a face object 
through the entire 413 frames. In all video frames, the secret message is a large text file 
segmented according to the size of the ROI. 
In order to evaluate the transparency of our algorithm, PSNR, PSNR-HVS 
(PSNRH), and modified PSNR-HVS (PSNRM) metrics are applied. Figure 4.9 explains 
the visual quality comparison when one LSB is used for embedding the hidden message 
from each of R, G, and B color channels. Here, the averages of PSNR, PSNRH, and 
PSNRM for the five experiments are 53.07, 64.01, and 74.51 dBs, respectively. Visual 
qualities of the stego videos are close to visual qualities of the original videos.  
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Figure 4.9 Averages of visual qualities for five videos using one LSB. 
Figure 4.10 shows the visual quality comparison when two LSBs are utilized to 
hide the secret message from each of three color components. The averages of PSNR, 
PSNRH, and PSNRM for the five videos are 43.10, 56.91, and 64.75 dBs, respectively.    
Table 4.8 summarizes the results of the visual qualities included in each PSNR, 
PSNRH, and PSNRM for the five experiments using one LSB, two LSBs, three LSBs, and 
four LSBs. 
In Figure 4.11, the visual quality comparison is shown by using three LSBs for 
the embedding payload from each of the RGB pixel components. Here, the averages of 
each PSNR, PSNRH, and PSNRM for the five experiments equal 36.86, 50.29, and 55.56 
dBs, respectively. 
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Figure 4.10 Averages of visual qualities for five experiments using two LSBs. 
Table 4.8 Visual qualities comparison for five experiments using each of one LSB, two LSBs, three LSBs, 
and four LSBs into R, G, and B color components. 
Visual 
quality 
No. of LSBs 
 in each R, G, 
and B 
Video1 Video2 Video3 Video4 Video5 
PSNR 
1 LSB 53.08 53.53 52.23 53.93 52.63 
2 LSBs 43.11 43.56 42.26 43.96 42.66 
3 LSBs 36.87 37.32 36.02 37.72 36.42 
4 LSBs 33.81 34.26 32.96 34.66 33.36 
PSNRH 
1 LSB 64.02 64.47 63.17 64.87 63.57 
2 LSBs 56.91 57.36 56.06 57.76 56.46 
3 LSBs 50.30 50.75 49.45 51.15 49.85 
4 LSBs 43.54 43.99 42.69 44.39 43.09 
PSNRM 
1 LSB 74.51 74.96 73.66 75.36 74.06 
2 LSBs 64.75 65.20 63.90 65.60 64.30 
3 LSBs 55.56 56.01 54.71 56.41 55.11 
4 LSBs 46.81 47.26 45.96 47.66 46.36 
101 
 
Figure 4.12 illustrates the visual quality comparison when four LSBs are used for 
embedding the hidden message in each of the color channels. The averages of each 
PSNR, PSNRH, and PSNRM for five videos are 33.81, 43.54, and 46.81 dBs, 
respectively. The PSNRM metric has enhanced the visual quality. In conclusion, due to 
the high values of PSNR, PSNRH, and PSNRM, the proposed algorithm has consistent 
visual qualities for stego videos. 
 
Figure 4.11 Averages of visual qualities for five videos using three LSBs. 
On the other hand, according to the [123], our method has a high embedding 
payload. The obtained embedding capacity ratios of our algorithm, when using one LSB, 
two LSBs, three LSBs, and four LSBs, are 5.5%, 10.9%, 16.4%, and 21.9%, respectively. 
In other words, the average of hidden data in five experiments are 20.8, 41.6, 62.4, and 
83.2 Megabits when using one LSB, two LSBs, three LSBs, and four LSBs, respectively. 
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A number of experiments were conducted that compares both embedding payload and 
visual quality of the proposed algorithm with other related algorithms.  
 
Figure 4.12 Averages of visual qualities for five experiments using four LSBs 
Table 4.9 shows the comparison of data embedding ratios of our proposed 
algorithm with others. Figure 4.13 illustrates the comparison of average visual quality of 
our algorithm with other related algorithms. The results of comparison demonstrated that 
our algorithm outperformed the three related algorithms in the literature in both visual 
quality and embedding capacity. Figure 4.14 summarizes the average of the data 
embedding payload of five experiments for this algorithm using one LSB, two LSBs, 
three LSBs, and four LSBs.  
Table 4.10 shows the experimental results of our algorithm and other nine 
algorithms based on embedding capacity, visual quality, host video preprocessing, and 
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secret message preprocessing. The proposed algorithm clearly dominates nine related 
algorithms by obtaining highest values of PSNR and HR. 
 
Figure 4.13 Visual quality comparison of our algorithm with Alavianmehr et al. [88], Cheddad et al. [86], 
and Tse-Hua et al. [123] existing algorithms. 
Table 4.9 The comparison of HRs for the proposed algorithm with other existing algorithms. 
 Proposed 
Algorithm 
Alavianmehr et al. 
[88] 
Cheddad et al. 
[86] 
Tse-Hua et al. [123] 
1 LSB 5.5 % 1.34 % 0.08 % 0.50 % 
2 LSBs 10.9 % 2.68 % 0.17 % 1.00 % 
3 LSBs 16.4 % 4.02 % 0.26 % 1.50 % 
4 LSBs 21.9 % 5.36 % 0.34 % 2.00 % 
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Figure 4.14 Average of the data embedding payload for five videos using each of one LSB, two LSBs, 
three LSBs, and four LSBs 
Table 4.10 Performance comparison of the proposed algorithm with existing methods. 
Method HR PSNR 
Video 
Preprocessing 
Message 
Preprocessing 
Chang et al. [53] 1.04% 37.00 dB    
Ma et al. [76] 0.10% 40.74 dB   
Shahid et al. [70] 0.98% 43.39 dB   
Wang et al. [83] 0.57% 37.05 dB   
Liu et al. [79] 0.09% 46.35 dB    
Ke et al. [80] 2.44% 34.54 dB   
Alavianmehr et al. [88] 1.34% 36.97 dB    
Cheddad et al. [86] 0.08% 61.22 dB   
Sadek et al. [87] 0.23% 54.64 dB   
Proposed algorithm 5.50% 63.78 dB       
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In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm for retrieving the 
secret message successfully, it is tested against various attacks (Gaussian noise with the 
zero mean and variance=0.01 and 0.001, Salt & Pepper noise with the density=0.01 and 
0.001, and Median Filtering). Table 4.11 illustrates the values of BER and Sim for the 
five experiments. Since our algorithm is applied on time domain, the BER and Sim values 
are reasonable but not ideal. Table 4.12 summarizes the performance of our algorithm 
under such attacks. The visual qualities (PSNR, PSNRH, and PSNRM) of the distorted 
videos are calculated and the visual qualities are acceptable. 
Table 4.11 BER and Sim values for the five distorted videos against three attacks. 
Type of Attack 
Video1 Video2 Video3 Video4 Video5 
Sim BER 
% 
Sim BER 
% 
Sim BER 
% 
Sim BER 
% 
Sim BER 
% 
No attacks 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 
Salt & 
Pepper 
D=0.01 0.76 24.5 0.76 24.2 0.75 25.1 0.76 23.9 0.75 24.8 
D=0.001 0.76 23.7 0.77 23.4 0.76 24.3 0.77 23.1 0.76 24 
Gaussian 
white 
V=0.01 0.69 31.4 0.69 31.1 0.68 32 0.69 30.8 0.68 31.7 
V=0.001 0.69 30.9 0.69 30.6 0.69 31.5 0.70 30.3 0.69 31.2 
Median filtering 0.79 21.4 0.79 21.1 0.78 22 0.79 20.8 0.78 21.7 
Finally, the security of our steganographic algorithm has been improved. The 
reason for this security improvement is based upon the cover video (facial regions) being 
changed frame to frame. Therefore, the attackers have an extremely difficult time 
determining the location of the hidden message. In addition, since two secret keys have 
been used prior to the embedding process, attackers will be further prevented from 
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reading the secret message. Moreover, applying the Hamming codes (15, 11) on the 
secret message as a part of the preprocessing stage, hackers will have additional obstacles 
to overcome in order to read the secret message. 
Table 4.12 Visual qualities comparison for the five distorted videos against three attacks. 
Visual 
quality 
Type of 
Attack  
Video1 Video2 Video3 Video4 Video5 
PSNR 
Impulsive 
D=0.01 23.17 23.62 22.32 24.02 22.72 
D=0.001 31.20 31.65 30.35 32.05 30.75 
Gaussian 
white 
V=0.01 18.95 19.40 18.10 19.80 18.50 
V=0.001 28.87 29.32 28.02 29.72 28.42 
Median filtering 25.26 25.71 24.41 26.11 24.81 
PSNRH 
Impulsive 
D=0.01 35.23 35.68 34.38 36.08 34.78 
D=0.001 45.27 45.72 44.42 46.12 44.82 
Gaussian 
white 
V=0.01 30.01 30.46 29.16 30.86 29.56 
V=0.001 39.93 40.38 39.08 40.78 39.48 
Median filtering 34.47 34.92 33.62 35.32 34.02 
PSNRM 
Impulsive 
D=0.01 38.06 38.51 37.21 38.91 37.61 
D=0.001 48.17 48.62 47.32 49.02 47.72 
Gaussian 
white 
V=0.01 33.37 33.82 32.52 34.22 32.92 
V=0.001 45.08 45.53 44.23 45.93 44.63 
Median filtering 38.99 39.44 38.14 39.84 38.54 
4.4 A Robust Video Steganography Algorithm in the Wavelet Domain 
Based on KLT Tracking and ECC 
This section presents experimental results that are implemented by the MATLAB 
software version R2013a. The same dataset as in Section 4.3 is used. PSNR, PSNRH, and 
PSNRM metrics are applied to measure the quality of the stego videos. Figure 4.15 
summarizes the visual quality comparison between the PSNR, PSNRH, and PSNRM 
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metrics totaling the average of the five experiments. Here, the averages of each PSNR, 
PSNRH, and PSNRM for the five experiments equal 56.90, 65.84, and 76.44 dBs, 
respectively. Overall, due to the high values of PSNR, PSNRH, and PSNRM, the proposed 
method has visual qualities the same as the original videos’ visual qualities. The PSNRM 
metric has improved the visual quality of all five stego videos better than the other two 
metrics. 
 
Figure 4.15 The PSNR, PSNRH, and PSNRM comparison for the average of the five experiments.  
In addition, the proposed algorithm has a high embedding payload according to 
the reference [123]. The average of obtained hiding ratios for five videos is 4.1%. 
Moreover, the average amount of the embedded secret message in experiments is 15.60 
Megabits. Figure 4.16 illustrates the average of the data embedding payload of five 
experiments for our steganographic algorithm.  
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Figure 4.16 Average of the data embedding payload of the five experiments. 
In contrast to the previous algorithm, mentioned in Section 4.3, this algorithm 
withstands against attacks because it operates in the transform domain. To assess the 
robustness of this algorithm against attacks, we have conducted the same experiments as 
mentioned in Section 4.3 (Gaussian noise with the zero mean and variance=0.01 and 
0.001, Salt & Pepper noise with the density=0.01 and 0.001, and Median Filtering). 
Table 4.13 illustrates the values of BER and Sim for the five experiments, which a low 
BER and a high Sim are achieved. Table 4.14 summarizes the performance of our 
algorithm under such attacks. The visual qualities (PSNR, PSNRH, and PSNRM) of the 
distorted videos are calculated and the visual qualities are reasonable. 
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Table 4.13 BER and Sim values for the five distorted videos against three attacks. 
Type of Attack 
Video1 Video2 Video3 Video4 Video5 
Sim BER 
% 
Sim BER 
% 
Sim BER 
% 
Sim BER 
% 
Sim BER 
% 
No attacks 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 
Salt & 
Pepper 
D=0.01 0.946 5.4 0.956 4.4 0.941 5.9 0.952 4.8 0.943 5.7 
D=0.001 0.987 1.3 0.989 1.1 0.979 2.1 0.993 0.7 0.984 1.6 
Gaussian 
white 
V=0.01 0.912 8.8 0.931 6.9 0.909 9.1 0.918 8.2 0.909 9.1 
V=0.001 0.968 3.2 0.979 2.1 0.959 4.1 0.974 2.6 0.965 3.5 
Median filtering 0.965 3.5 0.974 2.6 0.961 3.9 0.971 2.9 0.962 3.8 
Table 4.14 Visual qualities comparison for the five distorted videos against three attacks. 
Visual 
Quality 
Type of 
Attack  
Video1 Video2 Video3 Video4 Video5 
PSNR 
Impulsive 
D=0.01 32.87 33.32 32.02 33.72 32.42 
D=0.001 37.70 38.15 36.85 38.55 37.25 
Gaussian 
white 
V=0.01 31.45 31.90 30.60 32.30 31.00 
V=0.001 35.37 35.82 34.52 36.22 34.92 
Median filtering 35.56 36.01 34.71 36.41 35.11 
PSNRH 
Impulsive 
D=0.01 44.93 45.38 44.08 45.78 44.48 
D=0.001 51.77 52.22 50.92 52.62 51.32 
Gaussian 
white 
V=0.01 42.51 42.96 41.66 43.36 42.06 
V=0.001 46.43 46.88 45.58 47.28 45.98 
Median filtering 44.77 45.22 43.92 45.62 44.32 
PSNRM 
Impulsive 
D=0.01 47.76 48.21 46.91 48.61 47.31 
D=0.001 54.67 55.12 53.82 55.52 54.22 
Gaussian 
white 
V=0.01 45.87 46.32 45.02 46.72 45.42 
V=0.001 51.58 52.03 50.73 52.43 51.13 
Median filtering 49.29 49.74 48.44 50.14 48.84 
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4.5 A New Video Steganography Algorithm Based on the Multiple 
Object Tracking and ECC 
Three S2L1 video sequences of different views (View1, View3, and View4) were 
used from the well-known PETS2009 dataset [118]. The implemented videos contain 
moving objects which are taken by different stationary cameras. Experimental results are 
obtained by using the R2013a version of the MATLAB software program. The videos 
contain a 768 x 576 resolution at 30 frames per second, and a data rate of 12684 kbps. 
Each cover video sequence contains 795 frames. In all the video frames, the secret 
message appears as a large text file split in accordance with the size and number of the 
moving objects. 
The visual quality of the proposed algorithm is measured by applying the PSNR 
metric. Figure 4.17 shows the PSNR comparison of the first video (View1) when using 
one LSB and two LSBs of each motion object’s RGB pixels. Here, the PSNR values 
equal 47.73 dB for one LSB and 40.45 dB for two LSBs. Figure 4.18 illustrates the PSNR 
comparison of the View3 experiment when using one LSB and two LSBs of each motion 
pixel in the video frames. The PSNR values equal 50.93 and 43.88 dBs for one LSB and 
two LSBs, respectively. Figure 4.19 shows the PSNR comparison of the View4 video 
when using one LSB and two LSBs of each motion object’s RGB pixels. Here, the PSNR 
values equal 51.35 dB for one LSB and 44.16 dB for two LSBs. The third experiment 
(View4) has better visual quality among other experiments because it has fewer regions of 
moving objects than others. This means that View4 video can embed less size of the secret 
data than the other two experiments. Overall, the stego videos’ visual qualities are close 
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to the original videos’ visual qualities due to the high values of PNSRs for our proposed 
algorithm. 
 
Figure 4.17 The PSNR comparison of the View1 experiment.  
 
Figure 4.18 The PSNR comparison of the View3 video.  
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Figure 4.19 The PSNR comparison of the View4 experiment.  
On the other hand, according to the reference [123], our proposed algorithm has a 
high embedding payload. Here, the average of obtained hiding ratios for three 
experiments is 3.37%. The size of the hidden secret message in each View1, View3, and 
View4 videos using one LSB is 31.38, 14.62, and 12.95 Megabits, respectively. Moreover, 
when using two LSBs, the amount of the secret message in each View1, View3, and View4 
experiments will be 62.77, 29.25, and 25.92 Megabits, respectively. Figure 4.20, 4.21, 
and 4.22 illustrate the data embedding payload of the proposed steganography algorithm 
for each View1, View3, and View4 experiments, respectively. These three figures have 
shown the comparison of the embedding capacity of each video when one LSB and two 
LSBs of the moving objects’ pixels are utilized. The two LSBs were implemented in 
order to double the amount of the secret message in each experiment. Table 4.15 
illustrates the experimental results of our fifth algorithm with other algorithms based on 
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embedding capacity, visual quality, cover video preprocessing, and secret message 
preprocessing. 
 
Figure 4.20 The embedding payload comparison of the View1 experiment. 
 
Figure 4.21 The embedding payload comparison of the View3 video. 
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Figure 4.22 The embedding payload comparison of the View4 experiment. 
Table 4.15 Performance comparison of the proposed method with other existing methods. 
Method HR PSNR 
Video 
Preprocessing 
Message 
Preprocessing 
Chang et al. [53] 1.04% 37.00 dB    
Ma et al. [76] 0.10% 40.74 dB   
Shahid et al. [70] 0.98% 43.39 dB   
Wang et al. [83] 0.57% 37.05 dB   
Liu et al. [79] 0.09% 46.35 dB    
Ke et al. [80] 2.44% 34.54 dB   
Alavianmehr et al. [88] 1.34% 36.97 dB    
Proposed algorithm 3.37% 50.01 dB   
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4.6 A Robust and Secure Video Steganography Method in DWT-DCT 
Domains Based on Multiple Object Tracking and ECC 
A S2L1 video sequence was used from the well-known PETS2009 dataset [118]. 
The proposed algorithm results are achieved using MATLAB implementation of the 
algorithm. The cover video consists of a 768x576 video dimension at 30 frames/sec, and a 
12684 kbps data rate. The video sequence also includes 795 frames; each frame has 
multiple moving objects. In the entire video frames, the text messages appear as a sizeable 
file divided based on the number and size of the moving objects. 
The imperceptibility of our proposed algorithm is measured by utilizing PSNR. 
Figure 4.23 illustrates the PSNR comparison of the experiment video when using one 
LSB, two LSBs, and three LSBs of each motion object’s DWT coefficients, including 
each of LL, LH, HL, and HH subband.  The PSNR values equal 49.01, 42.70, and 36.41 
dBs when using one LSB, two LSBs, and three LSBs of each coefficient, respectively. 
Figure 4.24 illustrates the PSNR comparison of the tested video when using one LSB, two 
LSBs, and three LSBs of each motion object’s DCT coefficients, including both DCs and 
ACs. Here, the PSNR values equal 48.67, 41.45, and 35.95 dBs for each one LSB, two 
LSBs, and three LSBs, respectively. 
Figure 4.25 illustrates the original and stego 574th frame of the tested video along 
with histograms of their RGB components. The histograms show no obvious alteration in 
the video quality. Table 4.16 clarifies the average of visual qualities based on DWT and 
DCT domains. Overall, the embedded videos’ qualities are near to the host videos’ 
qualities because of the high values of PNSRs for our proposed algorithm. 
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Figure 4.23 The PSNR comparison of the experiment video in DWT domain. 
 
Figure 4.24 The PSNR comparison of the tested video in DCT domain. 
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Figure 4.25 Visual quality assessment: The first line illustrates the original 574th frame of the tested video 
along with histograms of its RGB channels. The second line shows the stego 574th frame of the tested video 
and histograms of RGB channels after embedding stage. 
Table 4.16 Average PSNR each of R, G, and B component of the experiment video after applying 
DWT and DCT transform domains.  
Transform 
Domains  
No. of 
coefficients 
PSNR_R PSNR_G   PSNR_B PSNR 
DWT 
(LL, LH, HL, 
and HH) 
Coff1LSB  49.39 49.16 48.49 49.01 
Coff1&2LSBs 43.08 42.85 42.18 42.70 
Coff1, 2, &3LSBs 36.79 36.56 35.89 36.41 
DCT 
(DC and AC) 
Coff1LSB 48.84 48.74 48.44 48.67 
Coff1&2LSBs 41.62 41.52 41.22 41.45 
Coff1, 2, &3LSBs 36.12 36.02 35.72 35.95 
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According to [123], our proposed algorithm has a high embedding capacity. Here, 
the average of the gained hiding ratio is 3.40% when our algorithm operates in DWT 
domain. This average has increased to 3.46% when the proposed algorithm operates in 
DCT domain. The average sizes of secret messages in both domains are 31.38, 62.77 and 
94.15 Megabits when using one LSB, two LSBs, and three LSBs of DWT and DCT 
coefficients, respectively. Figure 4.26 illustrates the data embedding capacity of the 
proposed steganography algorithm when using each of DWT and DCT domains. The 
figure has shown the comparison of the embedding capacity of the tested video when one 
LSB, two LSBs, and three LSBs of the moving objects’ DWT and DCT coefficients are 
utilized separately. Table 4.17 shows that our proposed algorithm outperforms other 
existing methods. 
Table 4.17 Performance comparison of the proposed method with other existing methods. 
Method HR PSNR 
Video 
Preprocessing 
Message 
Preprocessing 
Chang et al. [53] 1.04% 37.00 dB    
Ma et al. [76] 0.10% 40.74 dB   
Shahid et al. [70] 0.98% 43.39 dB   
Wang et al. [83] 0.57% 37.05 dB   
Liu et al. [79] 0.09% 46.35 dB    
Ke et al. [80] 2.44% 34.54 dB   
Alavianmehr et al. [88] 1.34% 36.97 dB    
Proposed algorithm 
DWT 3.40% 49.01 dB       
DCT 3.46% 48.67 dB   
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Figure 4.26 The embedding capacity comparison of the experiment in DWT-DCT domains. 
To measure the robustness of the proposed algorithm, the Sim and BER metrics 
have been utilized. The algorithm is tested under different types of attacks (Gaussian noise 
with the zero mean and variance=0.01 and 0.001, Salt & pepper noise with the 
density=0.01 and 0.001, and median filtering). To achieve the robustness of the algorithm, 
the higher Sim and lower BER must be obtained. Table 4.18 illustrates the robustness of 
the proposed method under various attacks.  
4.7 Additional Experiments  
Table 4.19 shows some additional experiments that have been conducted in order 
to validate the efficiency of our six video steganography algorithms. Also, it illustrates the 
reasonable tradeoff between PSNR and HR of our proposed algorithms when compared to 
the existing algorithms. 
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Table 4.18 Sim and BER values of our method under various attacks. 
Type of Attack 
DWT domain  DCT domain  
PSNR 
(dB) 
BER 
% 
Sim 
PSNR 
(dB) 
BER 
% 
Sim 
No attacks 49.01 0 1 48.67 0 1 
Salt & Pepper 
D=0.01 34.37 6.5 0.935 33.77 8.3 0.917 
D=0.001 39.2 2.4 0.976 38.6 4.2 0.958 
Gaussian 
white 
V=0.01 32.95 9.9 0.901 32.35 11.7 0.883 
V=0.001 36.87 4.3 0.957 36.27 6.1 0.939 
Median filtering 37.06 4.6 0.954 36.46 6.4 0.936 
Table 4.19 Additional experiments to validate the efficiency of our algorithms. 
Algorithm Number 
Our Proposed 
Results 
Additional Experiments 
Average 
Time/Sec 
Algorithm1 
HR 7.39% 8.50% 9.61% 10.72% 
201.69 
PSNR 51.75 dB 43.99 dB 36.23 dB 28.46 dB 
Algorithm2 
HR 28.12% 32.34% 36.56% 40.77% 
212.63 
PSNR 41.58 dB 35.34 dB 29.11 dB 22.87 dB 
Algorithm3 
HR 5.50% 7.15% 7.98% 8.80% 
311.196 
PSNR 63.78 dB  44.65 dB  35.08 dB 25.51 dB 
Algorithm4 
HR 4.10% 5.33% 5.95% 6.56% 
401.225 
PSNR 66.39 dB 46.47 dB 36.51 dB 26.56 dB 
Algorithm5 
HR 3.37% 4.38% 4.89% 5.39% 
544.286 
PSNR 50.01 dB 42.51 dB  35.01 dB  27.51 dB 
Algorithm6 
HR 3.43% 4.46% 4.97% 5.49% 
602.779 
PSNR 48.84 dB 41.51 dB  34.19 dB 26.86 dB 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Conclusion 
The main objective of this dissertation is to enhance video steganography 
methods. Hence, six new and efficient algorithms are proposed to maintain a reasonable 
trade-off between imperceptibility, hiding capacity, and robustness against various 
attacks. 
First, we proposed a highly secure video steganography algorithm based on ECC. 
In this algorithm, we combined steganography concepts with other system protection 
methods such as cryptography and ECC. Thus, encrypting and encoding the secret 
message prior to the embedding process provided an additional security level to the secret 
message and made it more robust against attacks during the transmission process.  
Then, an increased payload video steganography algorithm in the discrete wavelet 
domain based on ECC was proposed. This algorithm enhanced the hiding capacity of the 
secret message as compared to other algorithms reported in the literature.  
After that, we proposed a novel video steganography algorithm based on KLT 
tracking and ECC. This algorithm focused only on the facial regions of the video as a 
host data for embedding the secret message instead of using the entire video. These 
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methods enhanced imperceptibility. Furthermore, it will be challenging for unauthorized 
users and intruders to define the position of hidden data in each video frame since the 
hidden data is embedded into the ROI which changes from frame to frame, thus 
maintaining the security of hidden message.  
Next, we proposed a robust video steganography algorithm in the wavelet domain 
based on the KLT tracking and ECC. The robustness against attacks of this algorithm was 
enhanced due to the use of wavelet coefficients of facial regions as cover data to embed 
the secret message.  
Later, a new video steganography algorithm based on the MOT and ECC was 
proposed. This method used multiple motion objects throughout the video frames as 
regions of interest to conceal the secret message, thus improving each of imperceptibility 
and embedding capacity.  
Finally, we proposed a robust and secure video steganography algorithm in DWT-
DCT domains based on MOT and ECC. Each of DWT and DCT frequency coefficients 
of moving objects are used as cover data to embed the secret message. The security and 
robustness of this method enhanced as compared to other methods reported in the 
literature. 
Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed algorithms achieve higher 
embedding capacity as well as better visual quality of stego videos. Furthermore, the 
preprocessing steps increase the security and robustness of the proposed algorithms when 
compared to state-of-the-art methods. 
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5.2 Future Directions 
In continuation of this research, it is planned to propose a real-time video 
steganography algorithm based on multiple object tracking and ECC. Such algorithm will 
use multiple moving objects in security cameras or video surveillance systems as regions 
of interest to embed the secret information.  
It is also planned to apply our proposed algorithms in some other frequency 
domains such as curvelet transform for further improving the efficiency, visual quality, 
and security. 
In addition, it is planned to consider different types of error correcting codes in 
our proposed video steganography methods for further enhancing the robustness against 
signal processing operations and various attacks.   
124 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] A. Cheddad, J. Condell, K. Curran, and P. Mc Kevitt, "A secure and improved 
self-embedding algorithm to combat digital document forgery," Signal 
Processing, vol. 89, pp. 2324-2332, 2009. 
[2] X.-y. Wang, C.-p. Wang, H.-y. Yang, and P.-p. Niu, "A robust blind color image 
watermarking in quaternion Fourier transform domain," Journal of Systems and 
Software, vol. 86, pp. 255-277, 2013. 
[3] M. Masoumi and S. Amiri, "A blind scene-based watermarking for video 
copyright protection," AEU - International Journal of Electronics and 
Communications, vol. 67, pp. 528-535, 2013. 
[4] Z. Qian, G. Feng, X. Zhang, and S. Wang, "Image self-embedding with high-
quality restoration capability," Digital Signal Processing, vol. 21, pp. 278-286, 
2011. 
[5] F. Lusson, K. Bailey, M. Leeney, and K. Curran, "A novel approach to digital 
watermarking, exploiting colour spaces," Signal Processing, vol. 93, pp. 1268-
1294, 2013. 
[6] M. S. Subhedar and V. H. Mankar, "Current status and key issues in image 
steganography: A survey," Computer Science Review, vol. 13–14, pp. 95-113, 
2014. 
[7] S. Islam, M. R. Modi, and P. Gupta, "Edge-based image steganography," 
EURASIP Journal on Information Security, vol. 2014, pp. 1-14, 2014. 
125 
 
[8] M. Hasnaoui and M. Mitrea, "Multi-symbol QIM video watermarking," Signal 
Processing: Image Communication, vol. 29, pp. 107-127, 2014. 
[9] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "A novel video steganography algorithm in the 
wavelet domain based on the KLT tracking algorithm and BCH codes," in IEEE 
Long Island Systems, Applications and Technology Conference (LISAT), pp. 1-7, 
2015. 
[10] K. Qazanfari and R. Safabakhsh, "A new steganography method which preserves 
histogram: Generalization of LSB++," Information Sciences, vol. 277, pp. 90-101, 
2014. 
[11] L. Guangjie, L. Weiwei, D. Yuewei, and L. Shiguo, "Adaptive Steganography 
Based on Syndrome-Trellis Codes and Local Complexity," in Fourth 
International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking and Security 
(MINES), pp. 323-327, 2012. 
[12] C. Rupa, "A Digital Image Steganography using Sierpinski Gasket Fractal and 
PLSB," Journal of The Institution of Engineers (India): Series B, vol. 94, pp. 147-
151, 2013. 
[13] M. M. Sadek, A. S. Khalifa, and M. G. M. Mostafa, "Video steganography: a 
comprehensive review," Multimedia Tools and Applications, vol. 74, pp. 7063-
7094, 2015. 
[14] A. Cheddad, J. Condell, K. Curran, and P. Mc Kevitt, "Digital image 
steganography: Survey and analysis of current methods," Signal Processing, vol. 
90, pp. 727-752, 2010. 
126 
 
[15] R. Zhang, V. Sachnev, and H. Kim, "Fast BCH Syndrome Coding for 
Steganography," in Information Hiding. S. Katzenbeisser and A.-R. Sadeghi, 
Eds., ed: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, vol. 5806, pp. 48-58, 2009. 
[16] C. Fontaine and F. Galand, "How Can Reed-Solomon Codes Improve 
Steganographic Schemes?," in Information Hiding. T. Furon, F. Cayre, G. Doërr, 
and P. Bas, Eds., ed: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, vol. 4567, pp. 130-144, 2007. 
[17] A. Khan, A. Siddiqa, S. Munib, and S. A. Malik, "A recent survey of reversible 
watermarking techniques," Information Sciences, vol. 279, pp. 251-272, 2014. 
[18] T. Yiqi and W. KokSheik, "An Overview of Information Hiding in H.264/AVC 
Compressed Video," IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video 
Technology, vol. 24, pp. 305-319, 2014. 
[19] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "A high payload video steganography algorithm 
in DWT domain based on BCH codes (15, 11)," in Wireless Telecommunications 
Symposium (WTS), pp. 1-8, 2015. 
[20] W. Abu-Marie, A. Gutub, and H. Abu-Mansour, "Image Based Steganography 
Using Truth Table Based and Determinate Array on RGB Indicator," 
International Journal of Signal and Image Processing, vol. 1, pp. 196-204, 2010. 
[21] R. Das and T. Tuithung, "A novel steganography method for image based on 
Huffman Encoding," in Emerging Trends and Applications in Computer Science 
(NCETACS), 3rd National Conference on, pp. 14-18, 2012. 
[22] A. Khan and S. A. Malik, "A high capacity reversible watermarking approach for 
authenticating images: Exploiting down-sampling, histogram processing, and 
block selection," Information Sciences, vol. 256, pp. 162-183, 2014. 
127 
 
[23] D. Rosiyadi, S.-J. Horng, P. Fan, X. Wang, M. K. Khan, and Y. Pan, "Copyright 
protection for e-government document images," MultiMedia, IEEE, vol. 19, pp. 
62-73, 2012. 
[24] W.-H. Lin, S.-J. Horng, T.-W. Kao, R.-J. Chen, Y.-H. Chen, C.-L. Lee, and T. 
Terano, "Image copyright protection with forward error correction," Expert 
systems with applications, vol. 36, pp. 11888-11894, 2009. 
[25] S.-J. Horng, D. Rosiyadi, T. Li, T. Takao, M. Guo, and M. K. Khan, "A blind 
image copyright protection scheme for e-government," Journal of Visual 
Communication and Image Representation, vol. 24, pp. 1099-1105, 2013. 
[26] S.-J. Horng, D. Rosiyadi, P. Fan, X. Wang, and M. K. Khan, "An adaptive 
watermarking scheme for e-government document images," Multimedia Tools 
and Applications, vol. 72, pp. 3085-3103, 2014. 
[27] D. Rosiyadi, S.-J. Horng, N. Suryana, and N. Masthurah, "A comparison between 
the hybrid using genetic algorithm and the pure hybrid watermarking scheme," Int 
J Comput Theory and Eng (IJCTE), vol. 4, pp. 329-331, 2012. 
[28] P. C. Ritchey and V. J. Rego, "A context sensitive tiling system for information 
hiding," J Inf Hiding and Multimed Sig Process, vol. 3, pp. 212-226, 2012. 
[29] W.-H. Lin, Y.-R. Wang, S.-J. Horng, T.-W. Kao, and Y. Pan, "A blind 
watermarking method using maximum wavelet coefficient quantization," Expert 
systems with applications, vol. 36, pp. 11509-11516, 2009. 
[30] W.-H. Lin, Y.-R. Wang, and S.-J. Horng, "A wavelet-tree-based watermarking 
method using distance vector of binary cluster," Expert systems with applications, 
vol. 36, pp. 9869-9878, 2009. 
128 
 
[31] W.-H. Lin, S.-J. Horng, T.-W. Kao, P. Fan, C.-L. Lee, and Y. Pan, "An efficient 
watermarking method based on significant difference of wavelet coefficient 
quantization," IEEE Transactions on Multimedia, vol. 10, pp. 746-757, 2008. 
[32] H.-C. Huang, S.-C. Chu, J.-S. Pan, C.-Y. Huang, and B.-Y. Liao, "Tabu search 
based multi-watermarks embedding algorithm with multiple description coding," 
Information Sciences, vol. 181, pp. 3379-3396, 2011. 
[33] F.-C. Chang, H.-C. Huang, and H.-M. Hang, "Layered access control schemes on 
watermarked scalable media," The Journal of VLSI Signal Processing Systems for 
Signal, Image, and Video Technology, vol. 49, pp. 443-455, 2007. 
[34] A. Khan, S. A. Malik, A. Ali, R. Chamlawi, M. Hussain, M. T. Mahmood, and I. 
Usman, "Intelligent reversible watermarking and authentication: Hiding depth 
map information for 3D cameras," Information Sciences, vol. 216, pp. 155-175, 
2012. 
[35] M. Arsalan, S. A. Malik, and A. Khan, "Intelligent reversible watermarking in 
integer wavelet domain for medical images," Journal of Systems and Software, 
vol. 85, pp. 883-894, 2012. 
[36] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "A highly secure video steganography using 
Hamming code (7, 4)," in IEEE Long Island Systems, Applications and 
Technology Conference (LISAT), pp. 1-6, 2014. 
[37] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "An Efficient Video Steganography Algorithm 
Based on BCH Codes," in American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE) 
Conference, pp. 1-10, 2015. 
129 
 
[38] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "A novel video steganography algorithm in DCT 
domain based on hamming and BCH codes," in IEEE 37th Sarnoff Symposium, 
pp. 208-213, 2016. 
[39] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "An ECC/DCT-Based Robust Video 
Steganography Algorithm for Secure Data Communication," Journal of Cyber 
Security and Mobility, vol. 5, pp. 167-194, 2016. 
[40] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "A DCT-based robust video steganographic 
method using BCH error correcting codes," in IEEE Long Island Systems, 
Applications and Technology Conference (LISAT), pp. 1-6, 2016. 
[41] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "A video steganography algorithm based on 
Kanade-Lucas-Tomasi tracking algorithm and error correcting codes," 
Multimedia Tools and Applications, vol. 75, pp. 10311-10333, 2016. 
[42] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "A New Video Steganography Algorithm Based 
on the Multiple Object Tracking and Hamming Codes," in IEEE 14th 
International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications (ICMLA), pp. 
335-340, 2015. 
[43] R. J. Mstafa, K. M. Elleithy, and E. Abdelfattah, "A Robust and Secure Video 
Steganography Method in DWT-DCT Domains Based on Multiple Object 
Tracking and ECC," IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 5354-5365, 2017. 
[44] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "Compressed and raw video steganography 
techniques: a comprehensive survey and analysis," Multimedia Tools and 
Applications, pp. 1-38, 2016. 
130 
 
[45] R. J. Mstafa, K. M. Elleithy, and E. Abdelfattah, "Video Steganography 
Techniques: Taxonomy, Challenges, and Future Directions," in IEEE Long Island 
Systems, Applications and Technology Conference (LISAT), pp. 1-6, 2017. 
[46] W.-N. Lie and C.-W. Lin, "Enhancing video error resilience by using data-
embedding techniques," IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video 
Technology, vol. 16, pp. 300-308, 2006. 
[47] A. Yilmaz and A. A. Alatan, "Error concealment of video sequences by data 
hiding," in International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), pp. 679-82, 
2003. 
[48] D. L. Robie and R. M. Mersereau, "Video error correction using steganography," 
EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing, vol. 2002, pp. 164-173, 2002. 
[49] F. A. Petitcolas, R. J. Anderson, and M. G. Kuhn, "Information hiding-a survey," 
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 87, pp. 1062-1078, 1999. 
[50] D. Stanescu, M. Stratulat, B. Ciubotaru, D. Chiciudean, R. Cioarga, and M. 
Micea, "Embedding Data in Video Stream using Steganography," in 4th 
International Symposium on Applied Computational Intelligence and Informatics 
SACI '07, pp. 241-244, 2007. 
[51] R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "A highly secure video steganography using 
Hamming code (7, 4)," in IEEE Long Island, Systems, Applications and 
Technology Conference (LISAT), pp. 1-6, 2014. 
[52] Z. Wei, S. S. Cheung, and C. Minghua, "Hiding privacy information in video 
surveillance system," in IEEE International Conference on Image Processing, pp. 
II-868-871, 2005. 
131 
 
[53] I. Mehmood, M. Sajjad, S. Rho, and S. W. Baik, "Divide-and-conquer based 
summarization framework for extracting affective video content," 
Neurocomputing, vol. 174, pp. 393-403, 2016. 
[54] K. Muhammad, A. Jamil, F. Haleem, J. Zahoor, S. Muhammad, and B. Sung 
Wook, "A Secure Method for Color Image Steganography using Gray-Level 
Modification and Multi-level Encryption," KSII Transactions on Internet and 
Information Systems (TIIS), vol. 9, pp. 1938-1962, 2015. 
[55] K. Muhammad, M. Sajjad, and S. W. Baik, "Dual-Level Security based Cyclic18 
Steganographic Method and its Application for Secure Transmission of 
Keyframes during Wireless Capsule Endoscopy," Journal of Medical Systems, 
vol. 40, pp. 1-16, 2016. 
[56] P. List, A. Joch, J. Lainema, G. Bjontegaard, and M. Karczewicz, "Adaptive 
deblocking filter," IEEE transactions on circuits and systems for video 
technology, vol. 13, pp. 614-619, 2003. 
[57] T. Shanableh, "Data Hiding in MPEG Video Files Using Multivariate Regression 
and Flexible Macroblock Ordering," IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics 
and Security, vol. 7, pp. 455-464, 2012. 
[58] T. Wedi, "Adaptive interpolation filter for motion compensated prediction," in 
Proceedings International Conference on Image Processing, vol. 2, pp. II-509-II-
512, 2002. 
[59] G. Yang, J. Li, Y. He, and Z. Kang, "An information hiding algorithm based on 
intra-prediction modes and matrix coding for H. 264/AVC video stream," AEU-
132 
 
International Journal of Electronics and Communications, vol. 65, pp. 331-337, 
2011. 
[60] B. Liu, F. Liu, C. Yang, and Y. Sun, "Secure steganography in compressed video 
bitstreams," in Third International Conference on Availability, Reliability and 
Security, ARES 08., pp. 1382-1387, 2008. 
[61] P.-C. Chang, K.-L. Chung, J.-J. Chen, C.-H. Lin, and T.-J. Lin, "A DCT/DST-
based error propagation-free data hiding algorithm for HEVC intra-coded 
frames," Journal of Visual Communication and Image Representation, vol. 25, 
pp. 239-253, 2014. 
[62] Y. Hu, C. Zhang, and Y. Su, "Information hiding based on intra prediction modes 
for H. 264/AVC," in IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and Expo, pp. 
1231-1234, 2007. 
[63] H. Zhu, R. Wang, D. Xu, and X. Zhou, "Information Hiding Algorithm for H. 264 
Based on the predition difference of Intra_4× 4," in 3rd International Congress on 
Image and Signal Processing (CISP), pp. 487-490, 2010. 
[64] X. Zhang and S. Liu, "Method and Apparatus for Intra Mode Coding in HEVC," 
ed: Google Patents, 2012. 
[65] S. K. Kapotas and A. N. Skodras, "A new data hiding scheme for scene change 
detection in H. 264 encoded video sequences," in IEEE International Conference 
on Multimedia and Expo, pp. 277-280, 2008. 
[66] C. Xu, X. Ping, and T. Zhang, "Steganography in compressed video stream," in 
First International Conference on Innovative Computing, Information and 
Control, ICICIC'06, pp. 269-272, 2006. 
133 
 
[67] F. Pan, L. Xiang, X.-Y. Yang, and Y. Guo, "Video steganography using motion 
vector and linear block codes," in IEEE International Conference on Software 
Engineering and Service Sciences (ICSESS), pp. 592-595, 2010. 
[68] H. Bin, Z. Li-Yi, and Z. Wei-Dong, "A novel steganography algorithm based on 
motion vector and matrix encoding," in IEEE 3rd International Conference on 
Communication Software and Networks (ICCSN), pp. 406-409, 2011. 
[69] W. Jue, Z. Min-Qing, and S. Juan-Li, "Video steganography using motion vector 
components," in IEEE 3rd International Conference on Communication Software 
and Networks (ICCSN), pp. 500-503, 2011. 
[70] Z. Shahid, M. Chaumont, and W. Puech, "Considering the reconstruction loop for 
data hiding of intra-and inter-frames of H. 264/AVC," Signal, Image and Video 
Processing, vol. 7, pp. 75-93, 2013. 
[71] J. M. Thiesse, J. Jung, and M. Antonini, "Rate Distortion Data Hiding of Motion 
Vector Competition Information in Chroma and Luma Samples for Video 
Compression," IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, 
vol. 21, pp. 729-741, 2011. 
[72] J. M. Thiesse, J. Jung, and M. Antonini, "Data hiding of motion information in 
chroma and luma samples for video compression," in IEEE International 
Workshop on Multimedia Signal Processing (MMSP), pp. 217-221, 2010. 
[73] J. M. Thiesse, J. Jung, and M. Antonini, "Data hiding of intra prediction 
information in chroma samples for video compression," in 17th IEEE 
International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), pp. 2861-2864, 2010. 
134 
 
[74] P. Meuel, M. Chaumont, and W. Puech, "Data hiding in H. 264 video for lossless 
reconstruction of region of interest," in EUSIPCO 07: 15th European Signal 
Processing Conference, pp. 2301-2305, 2007. 
[75] Y. Li, H.-x. Chen, and Y. Zhao, "A new method of data hiding based on H. 264 
encoded video sequences," in IEEE 10th International Conference on Signal 
Processing (ICSP), pp. 1833-1836, 2010. 
[76] X. Ma, Z. Li, H. Tu, and B. Zhang, "A data hiding algorithm for H. 264/AVC 
video streams without intra-frame distortion drift," IEEE Transactions on Circuits 
and Systems for Video Technology, vol. 20, pp. 1320-1330, 2010. 
[77] Y. Liu, Z. Li, X. Ma, and J. Liu, "A novel data hiding scheme for H. 264/AVC 
video streams without intra-frame distortion drift," in IEEE 14th International 
Conference on Communication Technology (ICCT), pp. 824-828, 2012. 
[78] Y. Liu, Z. Li, X. Ma, and J. Liu, "A Robust Data Hiding Algorithm for H. 
264/AVC Video Streams without Intra-frame Distortion Drift," in Proceedings of 
the Second International Conference on Electric Information and Control 
Engineering-Volume 01, pp. 182-186, 2012. 
[79] Y. Liu, Z. Li, X. Ma, and J. Liu, "A Robust Data Hiding Algorithm for H. 
264/AVC Video Streams," Journal of Systems and Software, vol. 86, pp. 2174-
2183, 2013. 
[80] N. Ke and Z. Weidong, "A video steganography scheme based on H. 264 
bitstreams replaced," in 4th IEEE International Conference on Software 
Engineering and Service Science (ICSESS), pp. 447-450, 2013. 
135 
 
[81] K. Liao, S. Lian, Z. Guo, and J. Wang, "Efficient information hiding in H. 
264/AVC video coding," Telecommunication Systems, vol. 49, pp. 261-269, 2012. 
[82] C.-S. Lu, J.-R. Chen, and K.-C. Fan, "Real-time frame-dependent video 
watermarking in VLC domain," Signal Processing: Image Communication, vol. 
20, pp. 624-642, 2005. 
[83] R. WANG, L. HU, and D. XU, "A Watermarking Algorithm Based on the 
CABAC Entropy Coding for H.264/AVC," J. Comput. Inform. Syst., vol. 7, no. 6, 
pp. 2132–2141, 2011. 
[84] K. Muhammad, M. Sajjad, I. Mehmood, S. Rho, and S. Baik, "A novel magic 
LSB substitution method (M-LSB-SM) using multi-level encryption and 
achromatic component of an image," Multimedia Tools and Applications, vol. 75, 
pp. 14867-14893, 2016. 
[85] R. Zhang, V. Sachnev, M. B. Botnan, H. J. Kim, and J. Heo, "An efficient 
embedder for BCH coding for Steganography," IEEE Transactions on 
Information Theory, vol. 58, pp. 7272-7279, 2012. 
[86] A. Cheddad, J. Condell, K. Curran, and P. McKevitt, "Skin tone based 
Steganography in video files exploiting the YCbCr colour space," in IEEE 
International Conference on Multimedia and Expo, pp. 905-908, 2008. 
[87] M. M. Sadek, A. S. Khalifa, and M. G. Mostafa, "Robust video steganography 
algorithm using adaptive skin-tone detection," Multimedia Tools and 
Applications, vol. 76, pp. 3065-3085, 2017. 
[88] M. A. Alavianmehr, M. Rezaei, M. S. Helfroush, and A. Tashk, "A lossless data 
hiding scheme on video raw data robust against H.264/AVC compression," in 2nd 
136 
 
International eConference on Computer and Knowledge Engineering (ICCKE), 
pp. 194-198, 2012. 
[89] M. E. Eltahir, L. M. Kiah, and B. B. Zaidan, "High Rate Video Streaming 
Steganography," in International Conference on Information Management and 
Engineering, ICIME '09, pp. 550-553, 2009. 
[90] K. Dasgupta, J. K. Mondal, and P. Dutta, "Optimized Video Steganography Using 
Genetic Algorithm (GA)," Procedia Technology, vol. 10, pp. 131-137, 2013. 
[91] E. Kawaguchi and R. O. Eason, "Principles and applications of BPCS 
steganography," in Photonics East (ISAM, VVDC, IEMB), pp. 464-473, 1999. 
[92] S. Sun, "A New Information Hiding Method Based on Improved BPCS 
Steganography," Advances in Multimedia, vol. 2015, 2015. 
[93] K. Patel, K. K. Rora, K. Singh, and S. Verma, "Lazy Wavelet Transform Based 
Steganography in Video," in International Conference on Communication 
Systems and Network Technologies (CSNT), pp. 497-500, 2013. 
[94] J. Spaulding, H. Noda, M. N. Shirazi, and E. Kawaguchi, "BPCS steganography 
using EZW lossy compressed images," Pattern Recognition Letters, vol. 23, pp. 
1579-1587, 2002. 
[95] H. Noda, T. Furuta, M. Niimi, and E. Kawaguchi, "Application of BPCS 
steganography to wavelet compressed video," in International Conference on 
Image Processing, ICIP'04, pp. 2147-2150, 2004. 
[96] A. Sarkar, U. Madhow, and B. S. Manjunath, "Matrix Embedding With 
Pseudorandom Coefficient Selection and Error Correction for Robust and Secure 
137 
 
Steganography," IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 
5, pp. 225-239, 2010. 
[97] C. Chin-Chen, T. D. Kieu, and C. Yung-Chen, "A High Payload Steganographic 
Scheme Based on (7, 4) Hamming Code for Digital Images," in International 
Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, pp. 16-21, 2008,. 
[98] Y. Hoyoung, J. Jaehwan, J. Jihyuck, and P. In-Cheol, "Area-Efficient Multimode 
Encoding Architecture for Long BCH Codes," IEEE Transactions on Circuits and 
Systems II: Express Briefs, vol. 60, pp. 872-876, 2013. 
[99] A. K. Jain, "Fundamentals of digital image processing," Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989. 
[100] W. B. Pennebaker and J. L. Mitchell, "JPEG: Still image data compression 
standard," Springer Science & Business Media, 1992. 
[101] B. G. Vani and E. Prasad, "High Secure Image Steganography based on Hopfield 
Chaotic Neural Network and Wavelet Transforms," International Journal of 
Computer Science and Network Security (IJCSNS), vol. 13, p. 1, 2013. 
[102] G. Prabakaran and R. Bhavani, "A modified secure digital image steganography 
based on Discrete Wavelet Transform," in International Conference on 
Computing, Electronics and Electrical Technologies (ICCEET), pp. 1096-1100, , 
2012. 
[103] O. S. Faragallah, "Efficient video watermarking based on singular value 
decomposition in the discrete wavelet transform domain," AEU - International 
Journal of Electronics and Communications, vol. 67, pp. 189-196, 2013. 
138 
 
[104] S. G. Mallat, "A theory for multiresolution signal decomposition: the wavelet 
representation," IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine intelligence, 
vol. 11, pp. 674-693, 1989. 
[105] P. Viola and M. Jones, "Robust Real-Time Face Detection," International Journal 
of Computer Vision, vol. 57, pp. 137-154, 2004. 
[106] R. Isukapalli, A. Elgammal, and R. Greiner, "Learning a Dynamic Classification 
Method to Detect Faces and Identify Facial Expression," in Analysis and 
Modelling of Faces and Gestures. W. Zhao, S. Gong, and X. Tang, Eds., ed: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, vol. 3723, pp. 70-84, 2005. 
[107] P. Viola and M. Jones, "Rapid object detection using a boosted cascade of simple 
features," in Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer 
Vision and Pattern Recognition, CVPR, vol. 1, pp. I-511-I-518, 2001. 
[108] E. Torres-Pereira, H. Martins-Gomes, A. Monteiro-Brito, and J. de Carvalho, 
"Hybrid Parallel Cascade Classifier Training for Object Detection," in Progress in 
Pattern Recognition, Image Analysis, Computer Vision, and Applications. E. 
Bayro-Corrochano and E. Hancock, Eds., ed: Springer International Publishing, 
vol. 8827, pp. 810-817, 2014. 
[109] B. Leibe, A. Leonardis, and B. Schiele, "Robust Object Detection with 
Interleaved Categorization and Segmentation," International Journal of Computer 
Vision, vol. 77, pp. 259-289, 2008. 
[110] B. D. Lucas and T. Kanade, "An iterative image registration technique with an 
application to stereo vision," in 7th international joint conference on Artificial 
intelligence, pp. 674-679, 1981. 
139 
 
[111] C. Tomasi and T. Kanade, "Detection and tracking of point features," School of 
Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon Univ. Pittsburgh, 1991. 
[112] J. Shi and C. Tomasi, "Good features to track," in IEEE Computer Society 
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, Proceedings CVPR '94, 
pp. 593-600, 1994. 
[113] H. Fassold, J. Rosner, P. Schallauer, and W. Bailer, "Realtime KLT feature point 
tracking for high definition video," GraVisMa, 2009. 
[114] A. Cheddad, J. Condell, K. Curran, and P. Mc Kevitt, "A skin tone detection 
algorithm for an adaptive approach to steganography," Signal Processing, vol. 89, 
pp. 2465-2478, 2009. 
[115] L. Guo-Shiang and T. Tung-Sheng, "A face tracking method using feature point 
tracking," in International Conference on Information Security and Intelligence 
Control (ISIC), pp. 210-213, 2012. 
[116] K. Muhammad, J. Ahmad, M. Sajjad, and S. W. Baik, "Visual saliency models for 
summarization of diagnostic hysteroscopy videos in healthcare systems," 
SpringerPlus, vol. 5, pp. 1-13, 2016. 
[117] A. Yilmaz, O. Javed, and M. Shah, "Object tracking: A survey," Acm computing 
surveys (CSUR), vol. 38, pp. 1-45, 2006. 
[118] J. Ferryman and A. Shahrokni, "PETS2009: Dataset and challenge," in Twelfth 
IEEE International Workshop on Performance Evaluation of Tracking and 
Surveillance, pp. 1-6, 2009. 
140 
 
[119] J. Ahmad, M. Sajjad, I. Mehmood, S. Rho, and S. W. Baik, "Saliency-weighted 
graphs for efficient visual content description and their applications in real-time 
image retrieval systems," Journal of Real-Time Image Processing, pp. 1-17, 2015. 
[120] K. Muhammad, J. Ahmad, M. Sajjad, and M. Zubair, "Secure Image 
Steganography using Cryptography and Image Transposition," NED University 
Journal of Research, vol. 12, pp. 81-91, 2015. 
[121] K. Egiazarian, J. Astola, N. Ponomarenko, V. Lukin, F. Battisti, and M. Carli, 
"New full-reference quality metrics based on HVS," in proceedings of the second 
international workshop on video processing and quality metrics, vol. 4, 2006. 
[122] N. Ponomarenko, F. Silvestri, K. Egiazarian, M. Carli, J. Astola, and V. Lukin, 
"On between-coefficient contrast masking of DCT basis functions," in 
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Video Processing and 
Quality Metrics, vol. 4, 2007. 
[123] L. Tse-Hua and A. H. Tewfik, "A novel high-capacity data-embedding system," 
IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 15, pp. 2431-2440, 2006. 
[124] Y. He, G. Yang, and N. Zhu, "A real-time dual watermarking algorithm of 
H.264/AVC video stream for Video-on-Demand service," AEU - International 
Journal of Electronics and Communications, vol. 66, pp. 305-312, 2012. 
[125] J. Huang and Y. Q. Shi, "Reliable information bit hiding," IEEE Transactions on 
Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, vol. 12, pp. 916-920, 2002. 
[126] M. Barni, F. Bartolini, and N. Checcacci, "Watermarking of MPEG-4 video 
objects," IEEE Transactions on Multimedia, vol. 7, pp. 23-32, 2005. 
141 
 
[127] G. Li, Y. Ito, X. Yu, N. Nitta, and N. Babaguchi, "Recoverable privacy protection 
for video content distribution," EURASIP Journal on Information Security, vol. 
2009, pp. 1-11, 2009. 
[128] B. G. Mobasseri and M. P. Marcinak, "Watermarking of MPEG-2 video in 
compressed domain using VLC mapping," in Proceedings of the 7th workshop on 
Multimedia and security, pp. 91-94, 2005. 
[129] S. Khupse and N. N. Patil, "An adaptive steganography technique for videos 
using Steganoflage," in International Conference on Issues and Challenges in 
Intelligent Computing Techniques (ICICT), pp. 811-815, 2014. 
[130] S. K. Moon and R. D. Raut, "Analysis of secured video steganography using 
computer forensics technique for enhance data security," in IEEE Second 
International Conference on Image Information Processing (ICIIP), pp. 660-665, 
2013. 
[131] H. M. Kelash, O. F. Abdel Wahab, O. A. Elshakankiry, and H. S. El-sayed, 
"Hiding data in video sequences using steganography algorithms," in 
International Conference on ICT Convergence (ICTC), pp. 353-358, 2013. 
[132] R. Paul, A. K. Acharya, V. K. Yadav, and S. Batham, "Hiding large amount of 
data using a new approach of video steganography," in Confluence 2013: The 
Next Generation Information Technology Summit (4th International Conference),  
pp. 337-343, 2013. 
[133] A. T. Bhole and R. Patel, "Steganography over video file using Random Byte 
Hiding and LSB technique," in IEEE International Conference on Computational 
Intelligence & Computing Research (ICCIC), pp. 1-6, 2012. 
142 
 
[134] A. Hanafy, G. Salama, and Y. Z. Mohasseb, "A secure covert communication 
model based on video steganography," in IEEE Military Communications 
Conference, MILCOM 2008, pp. 1-6, 2008. 
[135] D.-C. Lou and C.-H. Hu, "LSB steganographic method based on reversible 
histogram transformation function for resisting statistical steganalysis," 
Information Sciences, vol. 188, pp. 346-358, 2012. 
[136] G. R. Tadiparthi and T. Sueyoshi, "A novel steganographic algorithm using 
animations as cover," Decision Support Systems, vol. 45, pp. 937-948, 2008. 
[137] S. Hu and U. KinTak, "A Novel Video Steganography based on Non-uniform 
Rectangular Partition," in IEEE 14th International Conference on Computational 
Science and Engineering (CSE), pp. 57-61, 2011. 
 
 
  
143 
 
 
APPENDIX A: PUBLICATIONS 
Journal Papers 
1. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “A video steganography algorithm based on 
Kanade-Lucas-Tomasi tracking algorithm and error correcting codes,” 
Multimedia Tools and Applications, vol. 75, pp. 10311-10333, 2016. (Springer 
IF=1.346)  
2. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “Compressed and Raw Video Steganography 
Techniques: A Comprehensive Survey and Analysis,” Multimedia Tools and 
Applications, pp. 1-38, 2017. (Springer IF=1.331) 
3. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “An ECC/DCT-Based Robust Video 
Steganography Algorithm for Secure Data Communication,” Journal of Cyber 
Security and Mobility, vol. 5, pp. 167-194, 2016. (BkCI) 
4. R. J. Mstafa, K. M. Elleithy, and E. Abdelfattah, “A Robust and Secure Video 
Steganography Method in DWT-DCT Domains Based on Multiple Object 
Tracking and ECC,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 5354-5365, 2017. (IEEE Access 
IF=1.27) 
 
 
 
144 
 
Conference Papers 
1. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “A highly secure video steganography using 
Hamming code (7, 4),” in IEEE Long Island Systems, Applications and 
Technology Conference (LISAT), pp. 1-6, 2014. 
2. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “An Efficient Video Steganography Algorithm 
Based on BCH Codes,” in American Society for Engineering Education 
Conference (ASEE), pp. 1- 10, 2015. 
3. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “A high payload video steganography algorithm 
in DWT domain based on BCH codes (15, 11),” in IEEE Wireless 
Telecommunications Symposium (WTS), pp. 1-8, 2015. 
4. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “A novel video steganography algorithm in the 
wavelet domain based on the KLT tracking algorithm and BCH codes,” in IEEE 
Long Island Systems, Applications and Technology Conference (LISAT), pp. 1-7, 
2015. 
5. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “A New Video Steganography Algorithm Based 
on the Multiple Object Tracking and Hamming Codes,” in IEEE 14th 
International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications (ICMLA), pp. 
335-340, 2015. 
6. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “A DCT-based Robust Video Steganographic 
Method Using BCH Error Correcting Codes,” in IEEE Long Island Systems, 
Applications and Technology Conference (LISAT), pp. 1-6, 2016. 
145 
 
7. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, “A novel video steganography algorithm in DCT 
domain based on hamming and BCH codes,” in IEEE 37th Sarnoff Symposium, 
pp. 208-213, 2016. 
8. R. J. Mstafa, K. M. Elleithy, and E. Abdelfattah, “Video Steganography 
Techniques: Taxonomy, Challenges, and Future Directions,” in IEEE Long Island 
Systems, Applications and Technology Conference (LISAT), pp. 1-6, 2017. 
 
Posters 
1. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "An adaptive Video Steganography Method 
Based on the Multiple Object Tracking and Hamming Codes," in ASEE, 
University of Massachusetts Lowell, MA, 2017. 
2. R. J. Mstafa and K. M. Elleithy, "Efficient and Robust Video Steganography 
Algorithms for Secure Data Communication," in Connecticut Symposium on 
Microelectronics and Optoelectronics (CMOC), University of Connecticut, CT, 
2017. 
 
